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PROPERTYS PROBLEM WITH EXTREMES
Lynda L. Butler*
Western-style property systems are ill-equipped to deal
with extremes xtreme poverty, extreme wealth, extreme
environmental harm. Though they can effectively handle
many problems, the current systems are inherently incapable
of providing the types of reform needed to address extreme
situations that are straining the fabric of societies-situations
that are stressing the integrity of core societal and natural
systems to the breaking point. The American property system,
in particular, is problematic. The system has a long tradition
of strong individual rights and relies primarily on the
efficiency norm to operate and shape the incentives of rights
holders. The economic model that now dominates the
American property system cannot, on its own, make the
reforms needed to address problems of extremes. The
assumption of a rational property owner and the individual
scale of decision-making create an intrinsically self-serving
system that will not, without redirection, force individual
owners to consider important, outside interests or internalize
serious, long-term externalities. Constitutional protection of
property, with its increasingly economic focus, reinforces the
owner-centric approach.
Yet property systems are fundamentally important to free
and secure societies. Strong property rights protect the
autonomy of individuals against government and third-party
infringement. They also promote economic activities,
rewarding investment and labor. A strong property system,
in other words, provides a way to order a society and its
resources by establishing a framework for allocating,
distributing, and managing interests in the resources. This
* All rights reserved, Lynda L. Butler. Chancellor Professor of Law and
Director, Property Rights Project, William & Mary Law School. B.S., William &
Mary; J.D., University of Virginia. I would like to thank William & Mary for
supporting this project through a Plumeri Award and the Law School for its
summer research grant support. Much appreciation also to Dennis Taylor for his
insightful comments and questions, participants at the 2018 Association of Law,
Property and Society Conference for their excellent questions and comments,
Lindsey Whitlow and Andrea Gumushian for their superb research assistance,
and Felicia Burton for her dedicated word processing support.
1
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
framework includes organizational and operating principles
that enable the society's economic and political systems to
work on a daily basis.
This Article focuses on property's problem with extremes
by asking whether it is possible to have a property system that
both protects individual rights and sustains the integrity of
the earth system. Because of its global scale and potentially
disastrous impacts, climate change provides the ultimate lens
for examining property's ability to handle extremes. Climate
change is a problem that affects the whole regardless of the
contributions of the part. It is a problem that needs solutions
from the whole but can benefit from the responsiveness of the
part. In order for Western property systems to operate in ways
that minimize property's adverse effects on the earth and on
humans, some fundamental rewiring of property's incentive
structure and operating rules must occur.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE SHADOW OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change is rewriting the world's sense of scale and place,
reiterating, with increasing poignancy, that greenhouse gas
emissions from human activities are fundamentally changing Earth's
climate and natural systems. "Within a year of emission, carbon
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dioxide is uniformly distributed throughout the global atmosphere"'
and can affect atmospheric conditions for many years to come.2
Climate change is a problem that affects the whole regardless of the
contributions of the part, ignoring the spatial and temporal ties that
have traditionally existed between uses and their place of origin. It
is a problem that needs the attention of the whole but can benefit from
the responsiveness of the part. Though an individual user's emissions
may seem minor, they accumulate in the atmosphere with other
users' emissions, producing a much greater cumulative impact over
time.3 Greenhouse gas emissions from a factory in India, coal-fired
powered plants in the United States, and deforestation in Indonesia
all affect our shared climate system, accumulating in the atmosphere
to the point where global temperatures have increased, oceans have
warmed, and global weather patterns have changed for generations
to come. The indeterminate number of emitters throughout the world
complicates the task of assigning legal responsibility under standard
legal principles, while the attenuated links between particular
emissions and particular harms exacerbate the moral dilemma facing
efforts to correct injustice or provide compensation for harm.4
The complexity of the climate change problem is evident from the
multitude of reports discussing the problem.5 From the climate
1. Jedediah Purdy, Climate Change and the Limits of the Possible, 18 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 289, 292 (2008).
2. JOSEPH RoMM, CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNow 22 (2d
ed. 2018) ("Some of the C02 that humans are putting into the air stays there for
thousands of years."); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate
Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, in FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 129
(2014), https://www.ipec.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipccwg3_ar5_full.pdf
("Because of the long atmospheric lifetime of C02, a fraction of the C02 emitted
to the atmosphere from James Watt's steam engine that in the late 18th century
helped trigger the Industrial Revolution still remains in the atmosphere.").
3. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41
ENVTL. L. 1, 35 (2011) ("[A]ny individual defendant can ... offer the
'consequentialist alibi' that its emissions are simply too small of a share of global
emissions to cause a discernable difference. It is only in combination with
millions of other emitters that the anthropogenic greenhouse effect becomes a
radical and potentially devastating climactic experiment.").
4. Id. at 20. The myriad of links in the "causal chain," each with their own
level of culpability, create severe difficulties for climate change plaintiffs. Id.
5. According to a June 2017 report written by thirteen federal agencies and
given final clearance by the Trump Administration, climate models still do not
capture all of the elements of the earth's system affecting climate change.
Further, the "unprecedented experiment" humans conduct on the climate system
through emissions, deforestation, and other changes to landscape have the
potential to lead to compound tipping point events. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT 35 (2017); see also Lisa Friedman,
Scientists Fear Trump Will Dismiss Blunt Climate Report, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/climate/climate-change-drastic-
warming-trump.html. For earlier reports, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 113-14; U.S. NAT'L AcAD. Sd. & ROYAL Soc'Y,
CLIMATE CHANGE: EVIDENCE AND CAUSES B6 (2016); NICHOLAS STERN, THE
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scientists explaining the dynamics of Earth's climate system to the
scientific methodologies used to study causes and effects and the
computer modeling performed to track data and identify trends,
climate change quickly enters a realm beyond the expertise of most
people.6 Adding to the complexity is the uncertainty about the rate
and the timing of the change and the magnitude of future harm.7
Though the vast majority of climate scientists agree on general
predictions given current conditions, more specific results depend, in
part, on actions taken by humans-for example, the uncertain nature
and level of future economic activities and government responses to
the problem.8 Further complicating the problem is the inertia of
EcoNOMIcs OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 7-8 (2007); AM.
METEOROLOGICAL Soc'Y, STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN 2016 (Jessica Blunden & Derek
S. Arndt eds., 2017), http://www.ametsoc.net/sotc20l6/StateoftheClimate2016
lowres.pdf.
6. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at
1281-328; Daniel A. Farber, Climate Models: A User's Guide 1 (U.C. Berkeley
Pub. Law & Legal. Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1030607, 2007)
(discussing computer modeling used in studying climate change).
7. See HARI OSOFSKY & LESLEY McALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND
POLICY 182 (2012).
8. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at
157-59 (discussing "[u]ncertainties that matter for climate policy choices"). The
authors note specifically that market behavior can be reliant on individuals'
investment behavior, which in turn depends on other uncertain factors, like the
price of fossil fuels. Id. at 158. They explain that decision makers are affected
by their perceptions of risks and uncertainties and how they weigh the costs and
benefits of potential policy changes. See id. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change ("IPCC") also recognizes observational uncertainties relating to
the effect of anthropogenic influence in other areas, including, but not limited to,
tropospheric temperatures (very likely that anthropogenic forcings contributed to
cooling of the lower stratosphere), Arctic warming ("likely that there has been an
anthropogenic contribution to the very substantial Arctic warming over the past
50 years"), upper ocean warming ("very likely that anthropogenic forcings have
made a substantial contribution to upper ocean warming . .. since the 1970s"),
and Arctic sea ice loss ("Anthropogenic forcings are very likely to have contributed
to Arctic sea ice loss since 1979."). INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, in FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT 869-70 (2013), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5
alljfinal.pdf.
It is important to note that the IPCC Working Groups discuss uncertainties using
two metrics: quantitative probabilities and qualitative assessments of
"[c]onfidence in the validity of a finding, based on the type, amount, quality, and
consistency of evidence . .. and the degree of agreement." MICHAEL D.
MASTRANDREA ET AL., GUIDANCE NOTE FOR LEAD AUTHORS OF THE IPCC FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT ON CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTIES 1 (2010),
https://wgl.ipcc.chIAR6/documents/AR5_UncertaintyGuidanceNote.pdf. For
instance, a demarcation of very high confidence reflects "robust" evidentiary
support, in conjunction with "high" agreement with the result. See id. at 3. A
classification of very likely has a 90-100 percent level of probability. Id. Further,
Working Group III's report on uncertainties contends that the way climate
change is managed will affect policy choices, represented by a feedback loop.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 156-57. Policy
4 [Vol. 55
2020] PROPERTY'S PROBLEM WITH EXTREMES
climate change as well as its continuous nature.9 Since the Industrial
Revolution began, humans have been emitting greenhouse gases
without realizing that those gases would eventually accumulate in
the atmosphere and the oceans to the point where the climate system
would change.10 Even if humans immediately stopped all greenhouse
gas emissions, climate change would still occur for years to come
because of the gases already accumulated in the atmosphere and the
oceans." The wide range of sources of greenhouse gas emissions
further adds to the difficulty of determining how to tackle the
problem. 12
Despite the complexity of the climate change problem, 97 percent
of climate scientists agree that it is "extremely likely that human
influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since
choices lead to perception of risk and responses to risk, which help create tools
for analyzing risk and uncertainty. These responses and tools allow for risk and
uncertainty management, which in turn influence policy decisions, completing
the loop. Id. at 156, fig.2.1.
9. Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rights, 1
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2011).
10. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at
129.
11. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate Change
2007: Synthesis Report, in FouRTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 46 (2008),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr-fullreport.pdf; ROMM,
supra note 2, at 28-30 (discussing whether we have crossed any tipping points
yet). The climate inertia problem reflects the slow environmental response time
to the elimination of a cause of climate change. The earth's system will continue
to change even after a source of the problem is eliminated, the impact on the
system only becoming apparent after a long period of time. See Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525-26 (2007) (recognizing the problem of climate inertia);
Kysar, supra note 3, at 40 ("Iost greenhouse gases are stock pollutants, capable
of persisting in the atmosphere and warming the planet for decades, even
centuries."); Kysar, supra note 3, at 40 n.195 ("Even if all anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions stopped tomorrow, the atmosphere would not restore
its pre-industrial concentration levels for one thousand years." (citing Susan
Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions,
106 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 1704, 1705 (2009))).
12. Some of the biggest contributors of greenhouse gas emissions include the
burning of fossil fuels, deforestation and agriculture, and industry. See
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 123
(approximating that in 2010, 35 percent of total anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions were attributed to the energy sector (made up of the burning of oil, gas,
and coal for electricity and heat production, but also fugitive, unintended gas
leaks), 23 percent to deforestation and agriculture, and 18 percent to industry).
While energy production makes up the largest portion of greenhouse gas
emissions, the calculation can become complicated. According to the report,
"Within the energy sector, most emissions originate from generation of electricity
that is, in turn, used in other sectors. Thus, accounting systems in other sectors
often refer to direct emissions from the sector . .. as well as 'indirect' emissions
that arise outside the boundaries of that particular economic sector . . . ." Id. at
125.
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the mid-20th century."1 3 The latest studies show that carbon in the
atmosphere is continuing to rise faster than predicted even though
greenhouse gas emissions have stabilized.14 Temperatures are still
rising, producing the hottest years on record and more warming than
predicted. 15 Glaciers are rapidly melting, affecting wildlife,
increasing the risk of fire, and contributing to rising sea levels.16 In
July 2017, a massive iceberg about the size of Delaware broke off from
the Antarctica ice shelf-much sooner than expected.1 7 In December
2015, parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change agreed at its Paris meeting to a global climate accord
that recognized the urgency of capping global warming below
2 degrees Celsius (i.e., 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit).18 Experts are hoping
that meeting this goal will prevent the earth from reaching a tipping
13. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate Change 2014
Synthesis Report: Summary for Policymakers, in FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 4
(2013), https://www.ipec.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYRFINAL
SPM.pdf. A 2017 final draft report reaches an even stronger conclusion, stating
that human influence on global warming is "extremely likely" (or 95 to 100 percent
certain). U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 5, at 14. The report
states that "there are no convincing alternative explanations" to the dramatic
increase in climate change-related issues supported by observational evidence.
Id. Between 1951 and 2010, human contribution led to a 1.10 to 1.40 Fahrenheit
global mean temperature increase. Id.; see also ROMM, supra note 2, at 7 (stating
that "all of the warming since 1970 is due to human causes").
14. See, e.g., Justin Gillis, Carbon in Atmosphere is Rising, Even as
Emissions Stabilize, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/06/26/cimate/carbon-in-atmosphere-is-rising-even-as-emissions-stabilize.html.
15. See U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 5, at 195 ("The
annual average temperature of the contiguous United States is projected to rise'
throughout the century. Increases for the period 2021-2050 relative to 1976-
2005 are projected to be about 2.5 0F .... Notably, a 2.5 0F ... increase makes the
near-term average comparable to the hottest year in the historical record (2012).
In other words, recent record-breaking years may be 'common' in the next few
decades."); John Abraham, Bad News for Climate Contrarians - 'The Best Data
We Have' Just Got Hotter, GUARDIAN (July 3, 2017, 6:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2017
/jul/03/bad-news-for-climate-contrarians-the-best-data-we-have-just-got-hotter
(discussing updated data that reveals more rapid warming).
16. Oliver Milman, US Glacier National Park Losing Its Glaciers with Just
26 of 150 Left, GUARDIAN (May 11, 2017, 5:09 AM), https://www.theguardian.com
/environment/2017/may/i 1/us-glacier-national-park-is-losing-its-glaciers-with-
just-26-of-150-left.
17. Maria-Jose Vifias, Massive Iceberg Breaks Off from Antarctica, NASA
(July 12, 2017), https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2017/massive-iceberg-
breaks-off-from-antarctica.
18. Paris Agreement art. 2, opened for signature Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S. No.
16-1104, U.N.T.S. 1-54113 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2016); see also Robinson
Meyer, A Reader's Guide to the Paris Agreement, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/12/a-readers-guide-to-the-
paris-agreement/420345/; Lynne Peeples, Historic Climate Change Agreement
Adopted in Paris, HUFFPOST (Dec. 12, 2015, 1:28 PM), https://www.huffpost.com
/entry/climate-change-paris-n566c2048e4b0e292150el69b.
6 [Vol. 55
2020] PROPERTY'S PROBLEM WITH EXTREMES
point-a threshold beyond which change becomes unstoppable and a
new state emerges.1 9
Impacts of climate change in the United States are already
noticeable in every part of the country. In addition to an increase in
average temperatures, more intense rain events, longer droughts,
and more extreme heat waves,20 sea level rise is already affecting
East Coast and Gulf Coast communities.21 In the Norfolk, Virginia,
and the Fort Lauderdale/Miami areas, residents are experiencing
frequent flooding of streets and homes.
22 Miami is planning a
$400 million project to raise roads and seawalls and install pumps,
while sea level rise in Norfolk is decades ahead of most other coastal
areas.23 According to a 2017 report by the Union of Concerned
Scientists, "[w]ithin 20 years . . . nearly 170 coastal US
communities-roughly twice as many as today-will reach or exceed
the threshold for chronic inundations, given moderate sea level
rise.... More than half of these 170 communities are currently home
to socioeconomically vulnerable neighborhoods."2 4 Sea and land ice
sheets also have been melting more quickly than expected in Alaska
and upper regions of the continental United States, causing
19. In a 2007 report, John Holdren, a leading US climate scientist, referred
to the importance of avoiding a tipping point. See John P. Holdren, The Future
of Climate Change Policy: The U.S.'s Last Chance to Lead, ScL. AM. (Sept. 1, 2008),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-future-of-climate-change-policy/;
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate Change 2014: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects, in FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT 1125 (2014), https://www.ipcc.chlsitelassets/uploads/2018
/02/WGIIAR5-PartAFINAL.pdf; ROMM, supra note 2, at 28-30 (discussing
whether we have crossed any tipping points yet); see also Green Mountain
Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 312-20 (D. Vt.
2007) (discussing the tipping point theory and legal challenges to it).
20. Other impacts include the spread of tropical diseases and worsening
wildfires. Justin Gillis, U.S. Climate Has Already Changed, Study Finds, Citing
Heat and Floods, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/0
7
/science/earth/climate-change-report.html; Craig Welch, Climate Change
Pushing Tropical Diseases Toward Arctic, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (June 14, 2017),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/06/vibrio-zika-west-nile-malaria-
diseases-spreading-climate-change/.
21. Justin Gillis, Flooding of Coast, Caused by Global Warming, Has Already
Begun, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/science
/flooding-of-coast-caused-by-global-warming-has-already-begun.html; Justin
Gillis, The Sea Level Did, in Fact, Rise Faster in the Southeast U.S., N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/climate/the-sea-level-did-in-
fact-rise-faster-in-the-southeast-us.html.
22. Gillis, Flooding of Coast, Caused by Global Warming, Has Already
Begun, supra note 21.
23. Id.
24. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, WHEN RISING SEAS HIT HOME: HARD
CHOICES AHEAD FOR HUNDREDS OF US COASTAL CITIES 2 (July 2017),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attachl20 17/07/when-rising-seas-hit-
home-full-report.pdf. The Union of Concerned Scientists defines a community as
subject to chronic inundation when 10 percent or more of its land area (excluding
wetlands) experiences flooding, on average, twenty-six times a year. Id. at 1.
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permafrost to thaw and release more greenhouse gases, destroying
important wildlife habitat and increasing erosion.25 Only twenty-six
of 150 glaciers in the United States' Glacier National Park remain,
and the continental United States will likely lose all of its glaciers in
a few decades.26
In one notable case, the melting of sea ice exposed an Eskimo
village, Kivalina, to significantly greater erosion and storms.27 The
village brought a federal nuisance suit against a number of fuel and
utility companies for substantially contributing to the climate change
that is adversely affecting Kivalina.28 Though recognizing the serious
harm being done to the village, the court concluded that a federal
common law nuisance action could not be brought because the Clean
Air Act and Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") action
displaced federal common law nuisance claims.29
The Trump Administration's shift in the federal government's
approach to climate change from regulation and active participation
in global agreements to denial of a problem30 puts into question the
validity of the displacement conclusion. When the federal
administration denies the existence of the climate change problem
and dismantles the regulatory regime addressing climate change, the
basis for the displacement conclusion appears to evaporate. "The
existence of laws generally applicable to the question is not sufficient;
25. See ROMM, supra note 2, at 73-74, 80-84, 118-23; see generally John P.
Holdren, The Science of Climate Change in the Arctic and Its Impacts (Oct. 27,
2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp
/the science ofclimatechange in.the arcticjphfulbright_10-27-16.pdf (slide
deck) (describing the effects of climate change in the Arctic region).
26. Milman, supra note 16.
27. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.
2012).
28. Id. at 853.
29. Id. at 856-58 (relying on the holding in Am. Elec. Power Co. v.
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011)).
30. Not only has the Trump Administration pulled the United States out of
the Paris Agreement, but agencies under the Trump Administration have made
efforts to remove climate change documents from main agency web pages and
change language referring to "climate change" to broader themes. See Umair
Irfan, "Climate Change" and "Global Warming" Are Disappearing from
Government Websites, Vox (Jan. 11, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://www.vox.com
/energy-and-environment/2017/11/9/16619120/trump-administration-removing-
cimate-change-epa-online-website (breaking down by agency the changes made
in language on websites and in placement of documents); see also Gregory
Wallace, Trump Environmental Nominees Question Climate Science, CNN (Nov.
8, 2017, 7:14 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/08/politics/trump-
environmental-nominees-question-climate-science/index.html (noting that
Kathleen Harnett White, the Trump Administration's nominee to head the White
House Council on Environmental Quality in 2017, believes that the "C02 in the
atmosphere has none of the characteristics of a pollutant that contaminates and
fouls and all of that that [sic] ... can have direct impact on human health as an
atmospheric gas," and that "science should overwhelmingly guide assessments,
but . . . [it should not] dictate policy results").
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the applicability of displacement is an issue-specific inquiry." 31 The
"salient question is 'whether Congress has provided a sufficient
legislative solution to the particular [issue] to warrant a conclusion
that [the] legislation has occupied the field to the exclusion of federal
common law."' 32 The Supreme Court, in American Electric Power Co.
v. Connecticut33 ("AEP'), reasoned that Congress had addressed
greenhouse gas emissions through the Clean Air Act's delegation to
the EPA and that the delegation and the emerging regulatory regime
displaced federal common law.3 4 The AEP Court, however, found
displacement in an entirely different context than what currently
exists. The AEP context involved an agency that had made the
endangerment finding for greenhouse gases, had begun to regulate
the emissions, and did not deny the occurrence of human-induced
climate change.35 Now that the EPA has started to rescind or
withdraw actions that it had previously taken to deal with
greenhouse gas emissionS36 and therefore no longer appears to agree
that greenhouse gases endanger the public, the basis of the AEP
Court's displacement conclusion is at least partially if not totally
gone.37 The test for displacement is lower than that for preemption-
31. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856.
32. Id. (quoting Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 667 F.3d 765, 777
(7th Cir. 2011)).
33. 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
34. Id. at 424. The Court held that "[t]he test for whether congressional
legislation excludes the declaration of federal common law is simply whether the
statute 'speak[s] directly to [the] question at issue."' Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (2010) (alterations in original)). Referencing
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Court held that:
[T]he Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any
federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide
emissions from fossil-fuel fired powerplants. Massachusetts made plain
that emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to
regulation under the Act.... And we think it equally plain that the Act
'speaks directly' to emissions of carbon dioxide from the defendants'
plants.
Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-35 (2007)).
35. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 416-17; see also Massachusetts, 549
U.S. at 532 ("Because greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act's
capacious definition of 'air pollutant,' we hold that EPA has the statutory
authority to regulate the emission of such gases from new motor vehicles.").
36. See Complying with President Trump's Executive Order on Energy
Independence, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/energy-independence (last visited Mar..
28, 2020); News Release, EPA, EPA to Review the Clean Power Plan Under
President Trump's Executive Order, (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.epa.gov
/newsreleases/epa-review-clean-power-plan-under-president-trumps-executive-
order; Nadja Popovich et al., 78 Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under
Trump, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate
/trump-environment-rules-reversed.html (last updated Dec. 28, 2018).
37. The Court introduced its displacement est by referring to the Clean Air
Act and EPA action. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424. Now that the
EPA is reversing its actions and removing climate change as part of its agenda,
displacement is no longer an "academic question," as described by the Court in
9
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for good reason.38 It would not make sense to allow serious and
potentially catastrophic harm to occur, without any redress in federal
courts, just because of political gridlock, ignorance, or worse in the
federal legislative and executive branches of government.
Many recommendations have been made and plans developed to
combat climate change and avoid the catastrophic consequences of
reaching a tipping point.39  Generally ignored by these
recommendations and plans is consideration of the role of Western-
style property systems in contributing to climate change and in
possibly addressing the problem.40 Those commentators who do focus
on property systems assume that solutions must be exogenous or, in
the case of the American property system, address the extent to which
constitutional principles would allow changes in property rights
without triggering constitutional obligations.4 1 What is left out, in
other words, is an examination of the fundamental norms and
operating principles of the property system, the extent to which they
2011. Id. at 423. Further, the precedent hat the Court relied on in stating that
action by the EPA was not yet necessary involved a different statutory setting
with an effective date set in the act. Id. at 420, 426.
38. See' id. at 423 ("Legislative displacement of federal common law does not
require the 'same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest [congressional] purpose'
demanded for preemption of state law." (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981))).
39. The Paris Agreement, for example, calls for "[h]olding the increase in the
global average temperature to well-below 2oC above pre-industrial levels" and
"[i]ncreasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change. . . in
a manner that does not threaten food production." Paris Agreement, supra note
18, at art. 2(1)(a)-(b).
40. See Kysar, supra note 3, at 4. Commentators, for example, are calling
for the use of tort law to establish "baseline principles of responsibility for harms
caused ... by anthropogenic climate change." Douglas A. Kysar, The Public Life
of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk Regulation Mechanism 5 (Yale L. Sch. Pub.
L. Research Paper No. 607, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006237.
41. The primary constitutional obligations that could be triggered by
government action involve the Takings and Due Process clauses of the Fifth
Amendment. The Takings Clause provides that no "private property shall be
taken for public use, without just compensation," while the Due Process Clause
protects citizens against deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.'' U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also J. Peter Byrne & Kathryn A. Zyla,
Climate Exactions, 75 MD. L. REV. 758, 763-65 (2016) (suggesting that imposing
monetary exactions to discourage new developments that will exacerbate climate
problems can help the government avoid litigating costly regulatory takings
claims that may require large compensation awards); Daniel A. Farber, Property
Rights and Climate Change 10-12 (Mar. 31, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=2418756 (noting that takings doctrine can pose difficulties for efforts to restrict
development in coastal areas and recognizing that while takings law must strike
a balance between flexibility and stability, climate change can add "a kind of
wildcard" to the balance analysis). But see Doremus, supra note 9, at 1105-10
(discussing the tension between flexibility and stability in property law and
observing that though coastal lands are dynamic, the legislature and judiciary
are reluctant to require private property owners to adapt to and internalize
environmental changes).
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have contributed to climate change, and the ability of a Western-style
property system to change-to evolve in ways that address the global
threat of climate change. To be meaningful, the changes would need
to include an expanded management function, an incentive structure
that reflects realistic biophysical conditions, and norms and values
that recognize outward-regarding obligations to vital social-ecological
systems affected by the exercise of property rights.
II. PROPERTY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO CLIMATE CHANGE
The institution of property provides a way to order a society and
its resources. Under the American and other Western-style
systems,42 property enables a society's economic system to work on a
daily basis and strengthens the autonomy of individuals in the
political system. Property facilitates the operation of social systems
by providing an infrastructure for allocating, distributing, and
managing interests in resources. The way property carries out these
functions, however, can tear a society apart when extremes develop-
extremes like widespread poverty, extraordinary wealth in the hands
of a few, global collective action problems, and disastrous
environmental harm like climate change. Understanding the
structure of property will help to identify aspects of property that act
as enablers of climate change.
A. Introducing the Structure of Property
The American property system is rooted in a strong tradition of
individual rights. During the early development of the common law
system, commentators and jurists tended to justify property rights
from a natural law perspective43 and stressed property's fundamental
42. Much of the focus of this Article will be on the American system of
property. This is, in part, because the United States has, until recently, been the
world's leading greenhouse gas emitter, and also because of some important
differences between the American and European systems that make it more
difficult for the American property system to change and adapt. As explained in
more detail in this Article, the American system includes constitutional
protections for property rights that have become intertwined with the
mainstream economic approach to property rights, as well as with common law
principles that reflect a weaker norm of sharing and a stronger, in rem nature.
See Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARiz. L. REV. 847, 854 (2013).
In The Resilience of Property, I discuss how the economic vision of property is
being constitutionalized, leading to a fundamental change in the institution of
property that involves a loss of resilience, adaptability, and flexibility. See id. at
854, 863; see also infra Part III.
43. Many attribute this approach to John Locke. See JOHN LocKE, Second
Treatise of Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 119, 133-37
(Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947); see also Bret Boyce, Property as a Natural Right and
as a Conventional Right in Constitutional Law, 29 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
201, 203 (2007); Roger Pilon, The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights:
America and Europe, PROGRESS FouND. 1, 2 (June 13, 2007),
www.progressfoundation.ch/en/document/2 8
6 (stating that the "clearest
11
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
role in protecting the liberty interest of individuals.44 Though the
importance of property to individual liberty is still recognized and
promoted,45 the mainstream economic approach has become the
primary justification for private property rights in ordinary life,
promoting efficient use by decreasing information costs, transaction
costs, and collective action problems.46 Further, it has even become
the central basis of regulatory takings analysis through concepts like
reasonable investment-backed expectations, diminution in value, and
loss of economically viable use.4 7
manifestation [of the natural law tradition is] . . . in John Locke's Second Treatise
of Government, which set forth not only the theory of rights on which American
government rests but the property and social contract theories that so informed
the founding generation's vision"); David C. Snyder, Locke on Natural Law and
Property Rights, 16 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 723, 726, 733-35, 738 (1986).
44. JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY (1792), reprinted in VI THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 101-03 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906); see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE
GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS 10-14, 16-17 (3d. ed. 2008); Butler, supra note 42, at 859.
45. Indeed, in recent years the individual rights perspective has taken on
renewed vigor through clarification and expansion of the U.S. Supreme Court's
takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,
570 U.S. 595, 604-05, 607, 619 (2013) (using the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to reverse the Florida Supreme Court's decision denying the existence of
a compensable taking, with Justice Alito explaining that "[e]xtortionate demands
for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause
not because they take property but because they impermissibly burden the right
not to have property taken without just compensation. As in other
unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses to cede a
constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a
governmental benefit is a constitutionally cognizable injury"); Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001) (holding that plaintiffs Penn Central claim "is
not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the
state-imposed restriction"); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015,
1019 (1992) (concluding that, while there is no definitive rule to determine
whether a compensable taking has occurred, "there are good reasons for ... [the
Supreme Court's] frequently expressed belief that when the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking").
46. See Doremus, supra note 9, at 1094-96; Gary D. Libecap & James L.
Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United
States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589, S589 (2002).
47. In Penn Central, for example, the Court announced that the presence of
reasonable investment-backed expectations was one of the factors important to
determining whether a regulatory taking had occurred. Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (noting that "[t]he economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations"). Again, in Lucas, the Court clarified that a total
loss of economically viable use was categorically a regulatory taking. Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1015-16 (concluding that there are two types of categorical regulatory
takings, in which, regardless of the benefit to the public, the individual should be
compensated: an actual, physical invasion of land, and in cases where regulation
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Under the mainstream economic theory of property, the system
allocates interests in resources to an owner, who acquires the power
to decide how and when to use the resource.4 8 Reflecting an owner-
centric, exclusion-based approach, the dominant theory views each
owner as a gatekeeper having important in rem rights that, when
exercised, bind all others in the legal system.49 Even third parties
not in a direct relationship with the owner may nonetheless be bound
by the owner's decisions.5 0 Although courts have developed some
constraints on the exercise of the owner's gatekeeping powers, those
constraints deal, for the most part, with direct relationships that
principles of economics and equity suggest should be part of the
property owner's decision-making process.
51 Traditional doctrines
limiting a property owner's gatekeeping powers generally focus on the
relationship between the property owner and others having an
interest in the same property (e.g., successors-in-interest, enants,
and easement holders) and, to a more limited extent, on relationships
between the property owner and close neighbors (e.g., in nuisance
situations).52 The mainstream approach thus values the norms of
efficiency, individual autonomy, and rewarding labor.
"denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land" (quoting Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))).
48. See Butler, supra note 42, at 853-54.
49. Lynda L. Butler, Property as a Management Institution, 82 BROOK. L.
REV. 1215, 1215 (2017). In rem rights are more limited in European property
systems, due in part to a more restrictive interpretation of the numerus clausus
doctrine, which defines the number and nature of permitted property rights as
well as the methods for creation, transfer, and destruction. See CASES, MATERIALS
AND TEXT ON PROPERTY LAW 65-75 (Sjef van Erp & Bram Akkermans eds., 2012).
Conversely, in the United States, in rem rights are paramount and are
interpreted as giving broad gatekeeping or decision-making powers over the
property. In cases such as Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 160-62 (D. Mass. 1881) and
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177-80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), for example, exclusive
rights to the hunted animals belonged to the "first possessor" as defined by the
courts, regardless of any labor exerted by a third party.
50. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1215 (stating that the exclusion-based
approach binds "all others in the legal system . . . to respect the property,"
including parties outside of the transaction at hand).
51. See id. at 1215-16, 1216 nn.2-5 (listing doctrines that place constraints
on property owners' gatekeeping powers, including the do-no-harm principle
(requiring landowners to consider the interests of neighboring landowners and
neighbors' sensitivity to spillovers), nuisance law (governing "unreasonable and
substantial interference with another's use and enjoyment of her property"), the
doctrine of equitable conversion (shifting constructive title-and therefore risk of
loss to the land-to the purchaser between execution of the contract for sale and
closing), and the doctrine of waste (restricting tenants' use of property in order
"to protect the landlord's reversionary interest")).
52. See id. at 1216 nn.2-5. In Louisiana, for example, neighbors must be in
"close proximity" for nuisance liability to exist. See, e.g., Woods v. Turbeville, 168
So.2d 915, 917 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that "a lawful business" cannot be
abated as a nuisance "unless the business is being operated in such a way as to
give serious and material discomfort and inconvenience to those who are living
in close proximity thereto"); see also Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.,
132020]
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Except when extremes develop, the dominant approach to
property works well much of the time. It is a low-cost approach to
allocating interests in resources, relying on the marketplace to shape
the incentives of property owners in managing and using their
resources. With a simple delegation of power, ownership rights are
placed in an individual owner and are protected from encroachment
and interference through the right to exclude.53 Those property
owners who use and manage their property efficiently are rewarded,
while those who do not are eventually replaced through the
marketplace. Reliance on the marketplace as a vehicle for managing
property interests thus means that the efficiency norm underlies the
modern American property system, and economic infeasibility
becomes the only consistent constraint.54
B. Limitations of the Dominant Approach to Property
The dominant approach to American property rights has built-in
features that limit its ability to deal with climate change. It was built
on physical facts about the earth and the natural environment that
have changed significantly over time-in part because of overuse and
ineffective resource management, and now because of greenhouse gas
emissions. The property system developed in a geologic era that
preceded the Anthropocene, where humans have become the
dominant geologic force.5 5 During the prior era, resources were
abundant, and the air and waters were in pristine condition.56 The
467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 690, 695 (E.D. La. 2006) (noting that the cases the plaintiffs
relied on were unconvincing to prove liability because they dealt with
"relationships between property owners that are characterized by proximity,"
where in this case such proximity did not exist).
53. Butler, supra note 49, at 1217.
54. See Paul Krugman, Building a Green Economy, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 7,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/magazine/I1Economy-t.html.
Krugman states that when a mutually beneficial transaction creates negative
externalities that do not require either transacting party to pay, "any
presumption that the market economy, left to its own devices, will do the right
thing goes out the window." Id. One way to deal with the negative externalities
is to impose laws and regulations (like a pollution tax) that make it infeasible for
the transacting parties to strike the bargain that creates the externalities. Id.
Another is the now popular "cap and trade" system-a system that allows for the
trading of emissions permits. Id.
55. See JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER ET AL., THE ECOLOGIcAL RIFT: CAPITALISM'S
WAR ON THE EARTH 13-14 (2010) (defining "Anthropocene" as meaning "New
Human" and-starting around the time of the Industrial Revolution-
representing "a new geological epoch in which humanity has become the main
driver of rapid changes in the earth system"); see also ELY, supra note 44, at 10-
11 (discussing how property ownership in the colonies stemmed from English
common law).
56. See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 55, at 12&-38 (discussing how human
activities have changed the accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere and the
climate cycle in unparalleled ways); see also ELY, supra note 44, at 25 ("The
constitutional underpinnings of property rights were forged during the colonial
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institution of property was superimposed on Earth's preexisting
biophysical systems. Land development, land use regulation, and the
expectations of property owners thus developed in the context of
physical facts that are changing or are no longer true. A 100-year
floodplain, for example, reflects historic records that are now
outdated and do not take into account a future with climate change.57
Though local and state governments can update their land use
regulatory standards and plans to reflect current biophysical
conditions and processes, the investment-backed expectations of
property owners have been shaped by now-outdated facts-and those
expectations matter enormously to constitutional and common law
property. By ratifying reasonable expectations of owners, property
law encourages investment and rewards productive use, enabling
economic activity to occur. Efforts to change the expectations of
property owners encounter serious resistance because reasonable
expectations may be constitutionally protected, shaped by values and
norms embedded within the property system itself.5 8 Under the
mainstream approach, those values and norms have taken on an
economic perspective, with the efficiency norm and the marketplace
platform used to allocate interests, communicate individual
preferences, and conduct transactions.
1. The Logic of Efficiency
The mainstream economic theory advanced to justify individual
property rights reflects certain values and assumptions that are
era. Blessed with abundant land, colonial North America furnished a uniquely
attractive environment for the property-conscious tenets of English
constitutionalism.").
57. In a lecture given at the University of Florida, Professor Daniel Farber
noted that in its 2010 report on sea-level rise, the Florida Oceans and Coastal
Council relied on historical data from 1929 to develop its coastal infrastructure.
Farber, supra note 41, at 2-3. He observed:
The world of 1929 is not going to be a good guide to the future. The
assumption of an unchanging natural world clearly does not hold today,
and it will be even further from reality in the future. Yet, our views of
property were developed during a world of stability that we have now
left behind us.
Id. at 3.
58. See Butler, supra note 42, at 888. Embedded norms often lead to
constitutional protection. Id. These norms can frame the way government
regulations are viewed even with respect to public property or problems with the
commons. Id. Staunch supporters of individual property rights, for example,
attack regulations addressing the problem of sea level rise, viewing the laws as a
way for the government to undermine fundamental property rights, rather than
as a mechanism to protect coastal lands. Id.; see also Doremus, supra note 9, at
1099 ("Cognitive framing suggests that there should be less political resistance
to changes that appear to strengthen rights than to those that appear to weaken
or remove rights, even those rights that no longer function efficiently.").
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inherently inconsistent with solving the climate change problem.59
The theory uses the logic of efficiency to make certain assumptions
and define the key principles that are used to analyze resource
conflicts and property rights issues.60 Although these assumptions
and principles might be useful for modeling market transactions and
behavior, they disregard the natural resource conditions that
contradict the assumptions. The allocation of gatekeeping powers
over a resource to the individual owner and the in rem effect generally
given to the exercise of those powers produces an inherent bias for
owner-centric thinking. For instance, in the past, American
landowners routinely drained and filled wetlands without considering
or understanding the important ecosystem services provided by those
wetlands.61 Even today, flood control projects along America's large
rivers employ dams, levees, and canals to control water flow and
minimize flooding of shorelands, despite the loss of nutrient-rich
sediment provided by flood waters.62 The impact on surrounding
agricultural lands has been significant, with farmers having to spend
more on fertilizer and rotate their fields more frequently.63
59. See Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within
Nature's Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927, 968-70 (2000) (discussing how
property norms have adversely affected ecosystems by causing them to be less
resilient and making them more vulnerable to disturbances).
60. See id. at 934-38 (discussing key principles and policies of the traditional
property approach); id. at 996-99 (discussing sources or bases of traditional
property norms).
61. See WILLIAM J. MITSCH & JAMES G. GOSSELINK, WETLANDS 45-47, 565-75
(2d ed. 1993); Butler, supra note 59, at 956 (discussing the millions of acres of
wetlands that have been drained and converted in the United States since the
late 1700s). Wetlands and forests are essential to maintaining ecosystems-they
help control water pollution, preserve wildlife habitats, and produce energy
savings. Id. at 956-57. And yet, both are disappearing by the millions of acres.
Id. at 956. Interestingly, one of Aristotle's students studied the practice of
draining wetlands, observing that this activity affected how water moderated
temperature and resulted in more extreme cold weather. See FOSTER ET AL.,
supra note 55, at 128.
62. See Butler, supra note 59, at 946-47 (discussing how the channelization
policies result in swifter and more efficient water flow but carry significant
ecological costs by increasing runoff, erosion, and flooding).
63. For instance, when watershed management programs focus on
management hrough a hydrological perspective-one that focuses on the water
collection, storage, and discharge functions of watersheds-rather than through
an ecological perspective, they ignore the fact that watersheds also provide
habitats for flora and fauna. See Butler, supra note 59, at 946-48. Consider the
federal government's channelization policy. In order to provide a faster, more
efficient water flow, the government adopted a policy to straighten rivers and
streams. Id. at 946. While the policy has some advantages, it has also increased
erosion and runoff, which in turn removes vegetative land cover and results in
greater downstream flooding. Id. at 946-47. In the case of the Mississippi River,
the lost nutrient-rich sediment is now carried downstream to the mouth of the
Mississippi and deposited into the Gulf beyond New Orleans toward the outer
continental shelf, instead of on shoreland along the way. ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK,
FACING CATASTROPHE 19 (2010) (stating that the "real culprits" in Louisiana's
16 [Vol. 55
PROPERTY'S PROBLEM WITH EXTREMES
The mainstream economic theory of property also assumes that
the property owner is a rational actor and that the owner's decisions
generally will promote the social welfare.6 4 A rational actor, however,
often will only consider her best interests in making decisions and
will ignore negative externalities and spillovers as long as the owner's
benefits exceed her costs.6 5 Under the American property system's
framework, individual property owners are "unknowingly guided by
options and assumptions embedded in the exclusion-based property
system."66 Property owners lack the incentives to bear the external
costs of their decisions unless forced to do so-not even when the
external costs are high and threaten the integrity of the whole.6 7
They, for instance, would cut costs by eliminating aspects of a
resource that do not produce a return, appear redundant and
therefore wasteful, or do not have an obvious economic role-even
though those features might be important to maintaining the
integrity of the resource.68 Studies by behavioral economists further
eroding coastlines are "human-made: Louisiana's vast network of levees,
navigational channels, and oil-and-gas infrastructure. The levee system
accelerates coastal land loss by reducing the natural flow of the river's freshwater
and sediment to wetland areas, where the lost land would then naturally be
replenished." The sediment that the river deposits in the Gulf of Mexico is lost,
and "the formation of barrier islands is impossible.").
64. Butler, supra note 42, at 854.
65. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1257-58 (discussing property's negative
externalities and spillovers and stating that "[a] rational acting property owner
will eliminate redundancies and focus narrowly on what is 'directly and
immediately beneficial to the owner"').
66. Id. at 1258-59. Efficiency guides the economic vision of property, leading
to increased "focus on allocation of interests in resources and away from other
important norms and factors." Butler, supra note 42, at 886. A strategy of
exclusion creates incentives for "property owners to maximize wealth," which in
turn leads to a "dichotomy of choices" and inflexibility in the institution of
property. Id. Rigidity develops as behavioral norms based on this dichotomy
"lose their connection to their original context and become drivers of behavior in
and of themselves." Id. Court decisions reinforce the rigidity, allowing the
options and assumptions to become embedded in the property regime. See id. at
886-87 ("The exclusion strategy, for example, is now being used to justify the
[Supreme] Court's per se approach to treating all permanent physical invasions
by government as compensable takings, no matter how small the invasion, how
beneficial the invasion to the private landowner, or how significant the public
interest. In other words, the traditional meaning of the exclusion strategy, with
all its advantages and weaknesses, has become part of the constitutional history
of property .... ).
67. Butler, supra note 49, at 1259. Indeed, some commentators have argued
that a cognitive bias toward individual victims is more likely to result in aid for
the victims than in a situation involving a general, society-wide harm. See Purdy,
supra note 1, at 296-97 (discussing how individuals are more likely to give to an
individual victim than to a more general cause that produced such victims).
68. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1258; see also id. at 1254-57 (discussing
how the commodity-based view of ecosystem services "has hastened 'the decline
of functionality throughout the natural systems. . . [and] limited the ability of
ecosystems to regenerate and sustain themselves."' A systems-based view of
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undermine reliance on the rational actor assumption, revealing that
individuals do not always decide as a rational actor would. These
studies have advanced our understanding of the degree to which
individuals deviate from rational actor thinking, identifying
heuristics and biases that affect decision-making.6 9 Climate change,
however, may be too overwhelming and too extreme to get our
attention, rational or otherwise. It is, in other words, a
"hyperobject"-a massive, "unimaginably vast" phenomenon that
humans cannot observe or access in its entirety.70
The economic-based concept of property is the engine that drives
a capitalist economy. Yet that engine has no brakes. Just as a car
built without brakes will eventually crash, so too will a property
system that encourages fossil fuel use and assumes brakes are not
necessary. Such a property system facilitates the commodification of
natural resources but does so without limitation, assuming that
unlimited growth is possible and that the exchange value in the
marketplace includes some form of environmental value.71 This
conversion "corrupt[s] . .. [the environment's] intrinsic value in
deference to a market logic." 7 2  The dominant, economic-based
property system does not recognize the need for an internal braking
system. Indeed, growth is often offered as a cure for society's ills. 7 3
The problem of climate change, however, demonstrates all too
clearly that the property system is not operating in a world of infinite
resources with the ability to absorb serious and continuing
externalities. Instead of curing the world's ills, the property system
is promoting and legitimizing the continuous release of greenhouse
gases into the atmosphere with serious consequences. Instead of
producing net social welfare, the growth-oriented property system is
encouraging the release of greenhouse gas emissions to the point
where experts fear the earth is reaching a tipping point.74 Beyond
ecosystem services would recognize the value of not just the goods, but also the
services ecosystems provide.).
69. See Purdy, supra note 1, at 297. People, for example, tend to
"overestimate greatly the importance of phenomena that are salient, that is,
readily available to the mind." Id. at 296; see also id. ("For instance, terrorism
acquired great salience as a threat in the wake of September 11, 2001, with the
result that Americans not only ranked it very high among threats and problems
facing the country, but estimated their personal risk of suffering a terrorist
incident at a little over eight percent-a vast overstatement, which would have
more than 25 million Americans a year directly affected by terrorism.").
70. TIMOTHY MORTON, HYPEROBJECTS: PHILOSOPHY AND ECOLOGY AFTER THE
END OF THE WORLD 1, 7-9, 15-16, 60, 70, 125, 131-32 (2013); see Purdy, supra
note 1, at 297.
71. CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT & DANIEL NYBERG, CLIMATE CHANGE, CAPITALISM,
AND CORPORATIONs: PROCESSES OF CREATIVE SELF-DESTRUCTION 190-93 (2015).
72. Id. at 190.
73. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1251.
74. See WRIGHT & NYBERG, supra note 71, at 1, 6. In December 2019, two
experts warned that the Amazon is now facing a tipping point because of
deforestation and fires. See Chris Mooney & Brady Dennis, Top Scientists Warn
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that point, the climate system cannot rebound and return to current
conditions.7 5 The unconstrained march toward a tipping point has
convinced some experts that a new definition of growth is needed-
one that includes a qualitative dimension.76 Rather than viewing
growth as "linear and unlimited," this new definition would recognize
that "[w]hile certain parts of organisms, or ecosystems, grow, others
decline, releasing and recycling their components."77 A qualitative
definition of growth, in other words, would recognize that growth
must "enhance H the quality of life" by producing a more complex,
sophisticated, and mature system.78
What features of the system would such a qualitative dimension
promote? A systems view of life helps to identify those characteristics
and related principles.7 9 Such an approach views a system as an
"integrated whole0."80 "[T]he qualities of a complex system refer to
properties of the system that none of its parts exhibit."81 Because
these qualities arise from the "processes and patterns of relationships
among the parts," they "cannot be expressed as the sum of properties
of the parts."8 2 Examples of qualities of the whole include the health,
stress level, and integrity of the system.83 These qualities are not
captured in quantitative measurements of the properties of the parts
(e.g., their mass or energy).84 The properties of the parts do not tell
us about a system's pattern of organization or how interactions of the
parts or the processes of interaction exert stress on the whole.85 What
of an Amazon 'Tipping Point', WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2019, 3:14 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/top-scientists-warn-of-
an-amazon-tipping-point/2019/12/20/9c9be954-233e- 1 lea-bed5-880264cc91a9
story.html.
75. See ROMIM, supra note 2, at 29-30 ("The latest science suggests that we
are getting close to levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that will trigger
irreversible changes . . . ."); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
supra note 13, at 77 ("The risks associated with temperatures at or above 4
0 C
include severe and widespread impacts on unique and threatened systems,
substantial species extinction, large risks to global and regional food security,
consequential constraints on common human activities, increased likelihood of
triggering tipping points (critical thresholds) and limited potential for adaptation
in some cases (high confidence).").
76. FRITJOF CAPRA & PIER LUIGI LUIsi, THE SYSTEMS VIEW OF LIFE: A
UNIFYING VISION 368 (2014).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 63.
81. Id. at 368.
82. Id. at 368-69.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.; Butler, supra note 49, at 1252-53. The IPCC's fifth report has
been interpreted as taking a systems approach. See Sarah J. Adams-Schoen et
al., A Response to the IPCC Fifth Assessment, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10027, 10035-36
(2015).
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good is the part if the stability of the whole is in danger of catastrophic
collapse?
2. Collective and Outward-Regarding Interests
The mainstream economic theory of property ignores collective
interests and fundamental norms not central to the individual
property owner's decision-making. Values like equality (which is
fundamental to a democracy) or resilience (which is critical to
ecological integrity) are not considered in a property system driven by
efficiency. Collective interests in preventing climate change are too
diffused to impose pressure on individual decision-making and too
attenuated in a temporal sense to cause concern.8 6 A "not-in-my-
lifetime" mentality pervades the thinking of many Americans today.8 7
Even when presented with the now-real impacts of sea-level rise or
intensified storms, many deny or ignore the evidence and purchase
property along the East and Gulf coasts.88 A business-as-usual
approach grounded in mainstream economics also drives the thinking
of many elected officials who are supported by powerful lobby groups
for the fossil fuel industry.89
86. Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime
Failure, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 195, 211 (2007).
87. See Megan Brenan & Lydia Saad, Global Warming Concern Steady
Despite Some Partisan Shifts, GALLUP (Mar. 28, 2018), https://news.gallup.com
/poll/231530/global-warming-concern-steady-despite-partisan-
shifts. aspx?version=print.
88. See BENDIXEN & AMANDI INT'L, 2017 Miami-Dade Real Estate Study,
MIAMI HERALD 85-86 (2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/1atest-news
/articlel63066413.ece/binary/MiamiDadeReal_%20Estate&Study_2017.pdf
(noting that 59 percent of real estate agents express concern about the global
impact of climate change and sea-level rise in the south Florida housing market,
but only 36 percent of their clients mention this concern in their housing search);
Blake Miller, 10 Hottest Real Estate Markets to Watch in 2017, TRULIA BLOG (Dec.
28, 2016, 8:10 AM), https://www.trulia.com/blog/10-hottest-real-estate-markets-
to-watch-in-2017/ (noting the top three "hot" markets are in Florida; of the top
ten, six are coastal cities). But see Erika Bolstead, High Ground Is Becoming Hot
Property as Sea Level Rises, Scl. AM. (May 1, 2017),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/high-ground-is-becoming-hot-
property-as-sea-level-rises/ (discussing the gentrification effect of sea level rise in
Miami and noting that "[t]o be on the beach and to be on the water costs a lot
more money, and the cheaper parts of town were furthest from the beach - but
it just turns out that the cheapest parts of town farthest from the beach are the
highest elevation, and now they're worth a lot more than they used to be"); Ian
Urbina, Perils of Climate Change Could Swamp Local Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/science/global-warming-
coastal-real-estate.html ("Rising sea levels are changing the way people think
about waterfront real estate. Though demand remains strong and developers
continue to build near the water in many coastal cities, homeowners across the
nation are slowly growing wary of buying property in areas most vulnerable to
the effects of climate change.").
89. See Lindsay Renick Mayer, Big Oil, Big Influence, PBS Now (Aug. 1,
2008), http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/347/oil-politics.html (noting that under the
George W. Bush Administration, the task force charged with contemplating an
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Public interests in government-owned or common resources are
frequently labeled as inefficient or wasteful.90 The importance of the
resource to the public and the legitimacy of government ownership
are ignored or challenged,91 with efforts made to alter the "mission"
of the resource or transfer it to private parties.92 Some powerful
energy policy for the United States met in secret and acted on the
recommendations of "Big Oil behemoths Exxon Mobil, Conoco, Shell Oil, BP
America and Chevron"; during that administration, oil companies spent over
$390 million lobbying the federal government); Suzanne Goldenberg & Helena
Bengtsson, Oil and Gas Industry Has Pumped Millions into Republican
Campaigns, GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com
/us-news/2016/mar/03/oil-and-gas-industry-has-pumped-millions-into-
republican-campaigns ("About one in three dollars donated to Republican
hopefuls from mega-rich individuals came from people who owe their fortunes to
fossil fuels - and who stand to lose the most in the fight against climate change.");
John Noel, The Chilling Effect of Oil and Gas Money on Our Democracy, CLEAN
WATER ACTION (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.cleanwateraction.org/publications
/chilling-effect-oil-and-gas-money-our-democracy ("In 2014 the oil and gas
industry contributed $64 million to campaigns, committees and outside groups.").
90. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1253-54; see also Butler, supra note 42, at
862-63 (noting that private, or individual rights, dominate the property regime).
For a thoughtful response to the current approach of property law and its impact
on society, see David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 1773,
1783-85 (2013) (discussing how property's role as protector of individual rights
should apply to all people by proposing a "new New Property" that uses
prescriptive rights, equitable doctrines, land use laws, and the Takings Clause to
protect vulnerable people).
91. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1254 n.209; Heather Hansman, Congress
Moves to Give Away National Lands, Discounting Billions in Revenue, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 19, 2017, 9:39 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/19
[bureau-land-management-federal-lease (discussing revision to the House of
Representatives' budget that would effectively cede 640 million acres of public
federal land to the states for "possible sale, mining or development"); Martin
Heinrich, Opinion, The Land Grab Out West, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/opinion/the-land-grab-out-west.html
(discussing attempts by western states to have federal lands that are not included
in national parks sold to private owners or given to governmental entities for
management).
92. The mission of the National Park Service states that:
The National Park Service preserves unimpaired the natural and
cultural resources and values of the National Park System for the
enjoyment, education, and inspiration of this and future generations.
The Park Service cooperates with partners to extend the benefits of
natural and cultural resource conservation and outdoor recreation
throughout this country and the world.
About Us, NAT'L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/index.htm (last
updated Jan. 31, 2020). There are those who believe the National Park Service
has abandoned its mission with its recent actions. See Jonathan Ratner,
National Park Service Abandons Its Mission, 23 WESTERN WATERSHEDS PROJECT
MESSENGER 12, 12-13 (2016) (explaining that the National Park Service is aware
of the degradation of land cause by the grazing of cattle, but has not acted to
prevent the damage); Opinion, NPS Abandons Its Mission, TIMES-TRIBUNE (Oct.
4, 2012), http://thetimes-tribune.com/opinionL/nps-abandons-its-mission-
1.1382751 (opining that the circuitous route taken to input a new power line
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property owners even blatantly ignore public rights in shared
resources and try to exclude the public from the resource. In the case
of Martin's Beach, for example, a Silicon Valley billionaire bought the
beach and then denied access to the public even though the public had
used the beach for almost one hundred years for surfing, fishing, and
other recreational purposes.93 In August 2017, a California appellate
court recognized the public's rights in the beach under California law
and ordered the billionaire to give the public access.94 Other wealthy
individuals have similarly tried to buy famous beaches in California
and turn them into exclusive private property.95 Under the current
economic and exclusion-based approach to property, public goods and
interests are often taken for granted, with noneconomic values
ignored or subordinated to private economic interests.
3. Over-Fragmentation
Another important limitation of the economic- and exclusion-
based approach to property is the overuse of the right to exclude and
through the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area created an eyesore
that is the opposite of the National Park Service's mission).
Some note that there is an inherent bias toward public-private partnerships,
assuming "for ideological reasons, that the private sector can always outperform
publicly managed projects." Michael Laris, State Control ofl-66Expansion Could
Net Virginia Substantial Revenue, WASH. POST (May 19, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/state-control-of-i-
66-expansion-could-net-virginia-substantial-revenue/2015/05/18/a3629d58-fd7f-
11e4-805c-c3f407e5a9e9_story.html.
93. Sam Levin, Silicon Valley Billionaire Loses Bid to Prevent Access to
Public Beach, GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2017, 5:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/environment/2017/aug/10/martins-beach-california-public-vinod-khosla.
94. Surfrider Found. v. Martin's Beach 1, LLC, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 418
(Ct. App. 2017). The trial court held that the California Coastal Act of 1976
required appellants to apply for a coastal development permit before closing off
public access to the beach. Id. at 388. The trial court then issued an injunction
that required "appellants to allow public coastal access at the same level that
existed when appellants bought the Martin Beach property in 2008." Id. At the
time of the decision, the status of public access rights in the privately-owned
beach was still undetermined and awaiting the resolution of a separate case. See
Friends of Martin's Beach v. Martin's Beach 1, LLC., 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 516 (Ct.
App. 2016). The appellate court in Surfrider presumed, pending the result of
Friends of Martin's Beach, "that prior access was permissive" because Surfrider
had not yet established a public right to access that was "recorded or judicially
determined." Surfrider, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 404. The appellate court treated the
injunction as "temporarily restricting appellants' right to exclude the public from
its property"; its temporary nature meant that the injunction was not a per se
taking. Id. at 404-05. Because appellants did not assert a basis for reversing
the injunction under the multi-factor test used to determine whether a taking
had occurred, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion and affirmed the injunction. Id. at 400; see also Levin, supra note 93.
95. Mary O'Hara, Get Off My Beach! How the Wealthy are Laying Claim to
California's Coast, GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2015, 1:04 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/02/california-wealthy-public-
beaches-private-security.
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the corresponding power to veto projects affecting or producing
shared resources. When too many property owners have the right to
exclude others from a shared or common resource, the problem of
over-fragmentation or the anti-commons arises.96 Exclusion-based
rights encourage the segmentation of resources.9 7 Each property
owner has the incentive to hold out for an exorbitant payout,
stymying efforts to protect resources or produce public goods. Each
disaggregation builds the veto power into increasingly smaller
units.98 Yet systems theory suggests that the dissection of the system
into smaller and smaller units may eventually destroy the whole.9 9
In developing a tract of land, for example, the landowner will ignore
the ecosystem services provided by different parts and by the
interactions of the parts. Habitat support generally will not figure
into the rational actor's decision-making calculus, nor will flood
control, nutrient recycling, the integrity of food webs, and water
purification.100 Eventually, after this pattern of decision-making is
repeated enough, ecosystems will begin to collapse and man-made
efforts to replace them will be too costly, inadequate, or simply
ineffective. 101
4. Property's Problem of Scale
The individual nature of property rights is central to the
American property system.10 2 It reflects the fundamental importance
of property rights to Americans' liberty interests and fits well with
the modern economic theory of property.10 3 It does not, however, take
96. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622, 624 (1998); Frank
I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in 24 NoMos: ETHICS,
ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 6, 9 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1982).
97. See Heller, supra note 96, at 677.
98. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1260.
99. See id.
100. See Butler, supra note 59, at 986-87 (discussing the development
proposal for land along the Potomac River in southern Maryland).
101. When deciding whether to build a water treatment system or rely on
natural processes, for example, New York City chose to forego building expensive
treatment facilities in favor of managing water naturally as it ran through
private lands in upper New York State by using various land use controls. See
Adams-Schoen et al., supra note 85, at 10036-37; Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., A
Culture of Mismanagement: Environmental Protection and Enforcement at the
New York City Department of Environmental Protection, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
233, 236 n.7 (1997). Man-made wetlands also lack the diversity and quality of
natural wetlands. EPA, Executive Summary, 1 WETLAND CREATION AND
RESTORATION: THE STATUS OF THE SCIENCE xii (Jon A. Kusler & Mary E. Kentula
eds. 1989) ("Restoration or creation of a wetland that 'totally duplicates' a
natural-occurring wetland is impossible; however, some systems may be
approximated and individual wetland functions may be restored or created.").
102. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1215.
103. See id. at 1218, 1258-59.
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into account the potentially catastrophic problem of climate change-
at least not as property is currently structured. Under current
thinking, significant problems of scale arise from the narrow focus on
the individual owner's rights and interests and not on the true scales
of a decision-the actual footprint of the owner's decisions over time,
space, and systems (both natural and social). The individual owner's
decision-making calculus is confined for the most part to the owner's
chain of title and to the physical or legal boundaries of the property. 104
Left out of the owner's thinking is any sense of cumulative impact on
ecosystems, diffused harm to systems, or distributional consequences
for society. When these factors lead to extreme harm, the larger
threat to the whole should matter.
The inadequacy of the temporal scale of a property owner's
decision-making is especially evident in the context of climate change.
The owner reaps the benefits of activities releasing greenhouse gas
emissions that will impose potentially catastrophic costs on future
generations. Though economic analysis uses discounting to include
some of those future costs, many commentators are troubled by the
application of discounting to such a potentially catastrophic
problem.10 5 Present value analysis assumes that the costs on future
generations can be adequately measured and does not bring home the
costs to the emitter absent legal action. 106 Also, as the climate change
problem so poignantly demonstrates, discounting ignores the serious
if not catastrophic harm of cumulative greenhouse gas emissions.
Because the harm could occur hundreds of years from now,
discounting those future costs is nearly impossible.1 0 7 The problem
of climate inertia further complicates the analysis. Greenhouse gases
that have already accumulated in the atmosphere will remain there
for a very long time, with new emissions adding to those
104. See id. at 1247, 1261-62.
105. See id. at 1261; Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the
Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 40-44 (2001) [hereinafter
Kysar, Sustainability]; Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 675, 688-91 (2003) [hereinafter Kysar, Vision].
106. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1261; Kysar, Sustainability, supra note 105,
at 3-5, 8-17, 28-31; Kysar, Vision, supra note 105, at 678-83, 685-93.
107. Kysar, supra note 3, at 40 ('"Most greenhouse gases are stock pollutants,
capable of persisting in the atmosphere and warming the planet for decades, even
centuries."). According to the EPA, carbon dioxide is the most commonly emitted
greenhouse gas, at 65 percent of global and 81 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions. See Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data (last
updated Sept. 13, 2019). Greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for
different amounts of time. For example, methane persists for roughly twelve
years, nitrous oxide can dissolve in around 114 years, while carbon dioxide can
remain in the atmosphere anywhere from twenty to two hundred years. See
Duncan Clark, How Long Do Greenhouse Gases Stay in the Air?, GUARDIAN (Jan.
16, 2012), https://www.theguardian.comlenvironment/2012/jan/16/greenhouse-
gases-remain-air.
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concentrations.0 8 The cumulative and additive nature of greenhouse
gas emissions thus makes the individual property owner's sense of
time totally inadequate.
The spatial scale of an individual property owner's decision-
making also is too narrowly defined to capture the true footprint of
the decision. Although common law principles of property and
nuisance law force owners to consider some spatial considerations
that reach beyond their property's physical boundaries,109 those
principles are generally limited to neighbors in close proximity or to
direct and specific causal links." 0  Legal principles like the
substantial harm requirement and the foreseeability concept limit the
availability of relief to individual landowners."' As a consequence,
diffused harm that is substantial in the aggregate but not on an
individual basis is ignored. Even though the actual harm from
climate change may be substantial over spatial and temporal scales,
the harm to a particular property owner may be minor.
The ecological or natural systems scale of a property owner's
perspective is also problematic. Although environmental laws have
forced property owners to consider the ecological impacts of some
uses, these laws tend to ignore long-term, global, or system-wide
impacts.112 These laws, for example, do not require a property owner
108. See Doremus, supra note 9, at 1093 (discussing climate inertia); supra
text accompanying notes 9, 11. See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
525, 545 (2007) (recognizing the cumulative and additive characteristics of
greenhouse gas emissions).
109. See Kysar, Vision, supra note 105, at 695-96.
110. See, e.g., Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d
676, 690, 694 (E.D. La. 2006) (rejecting plaintiffs' group liability theory absent a
showing of individual causation).
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
112. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2018)
(providing a method for the conservation and protection of endangered species
and their habitats by regulating the import, export, interstate, and foreign
commerce involving listed endangered species); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1388 (regulating disposal of pollutants into waters of the United States,
and quality standards for surface waters); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671q (regulating emissions from motor vehicles, power plants, industrial plants,
and other nonmobile facilities, as well as chemical emissions, hazardous and toxic
air pollutants, and, as of a 2007 Supreme Court decision, greenhouse gases). One
exception would be the laws addressing the ozone problem. In contrast to climate
change, developed countries were able to agree on how to solve the problem in
the Montreal Protocol. Unlike climate change, the problem and solutions were
clear, and the results fairly immediate. The 1987 Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer provided controls on ozone-depleting
substances ("ODS"). See Owen Greene, The System for Implementation Review
in the Ozone Regime, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 89, 89-90
(David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998). Within ten years, 156 states had ratified the
Protocol, "global consumption and production of the main ODS stopped
expanding and began to decrease .. . [and m]ost developed countries had
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to manage for ecological resilience.113 Rather, under the dominant
approach, a property owner is allowed to segment natural resources
into individually owned units while ignoring important ecosystem
services provided by a resource, especially the dynamic interactions
among the parts.114 By severing the natural resource into legally
independent units, the owner is able to convert the natural resource
into smaller units having an exchange value.1 15 As the process of
subdivision or severance continues, the narrow scales of the
individual owner's decision-making become incorporated into
increasingly segmented resources. The gatekeeping power of the
owner is thus dispersed, resulting in a "diffusion of responsibility"
and a loss of accountability.11 6 Over time, as the diffusion continues,
the impacts on the overall system become progressively attenuated
and insulated, limiting legal liability.
5. The Coupling Problem of Constitutionally Protected Property
To compound matters, the inherent bias of the American property
system for an exclusion-based approach has become embedded in
constitutionally protected property rights.117  Constitutional
substantially phased out consumption of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons."
Id.
In contrast, the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change
("UNFCCC") met first in 1994 to discuss the Kyoto Protocol for setting target
reductions in greenhouse emissions. See What Is the Kyoto Protocol?, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol
/backgroundlitems/2879.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2020). Within a year,
UNFCCC's member countries recognized the need for stricter demands in
reducing greenhouse gases. Id. In 2001, more negotiations occurred, and it was
not "entered into force" until 2005. Id. The complexity of the climate change
problem produced a complicated response, with commitments to reduction,
though binding, varying across each adopting nation. See id.; ROMM, supra note
2, at 153-54 (discussing the Kyoto Protocol's requirement that developing
countries cut total greenhouse gas emissions by 5 percent from 1990 to 2008-
2012). To complicate matters further, to "compensate for binding targets,"
countries had flexibility in how they achieve their target goal; for instance, rather
than actually reducing their emissions, member countries could partially
compensate for their emissions by planting forests, or "sinks," in their own
territory or the territory of another member nation. See UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, KYoTo PROTOCOL REFERENCE
MANUAL: ON ACCOUNTING OF EMISSIONS AND ASSIGNED AMOUNT 4, 12, 15, 21,
(2008), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/08_unfccckpref
manual.pdf.
113. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544; Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
114. See DAVID HARVEY, SEVENTEEN CONTRADICTIONS AND THE END OF
CAPITALISM 250-51 (2014).
115. See id.
116. See MARILYN A. BROWN & BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY: TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY OPTIONS 215-16 (2011);
Butler, supra note 49, at 1263.
117. Butler, supra note 42, at 876-82.
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protection of property under the Takings Clause directs the courts
toward an individual rights analysis that reflects the exclusionary
approach to property.118 In evaluating a property owner's takings
claim, courts rely on this bias in defining the economic impacts of a
law on the property owner.119 The public interest does not become
part of the constitutional calculus in evaluating whether a regulatory
taking has occurred, only in determining whether the law was a
constitutionally valid exercise of the police power. 120 Instead of
considering the costs of a property use to a shared or common resource
in determining the economic impact, courts view the public interest
merely as a threshold "public exigency" that may validate police
power action but not justify the regulatory intrusion on property
rights. 121 This logic seems to rule out consideration of the public
quality of a shared or common resource like navigable waters, the
atmosphere, and the climate system. Unfortunately, then, the
embedding of the exclusion-based, economic approach to property
within constitutionally protected property is magnifying property's
problem of scale in potentially catastrophic ways.
The problem with addressing extreme or improbable events is
that they are so unexpected that societies are unable to recognize or
handle them.122 Some experts suggest that climate change may be
such a phenomenon, with its impacts falling on the most unlikely part
of a standard probability distribution.123  Under the dominant
economic- and exclusion-based approach to property, the American
institution of property is not prepared for such an event. It has
become locked into a logic of decision-making that omits outward-
regarding interests vital to the integrity of the whole and spillovers
that do not immediately or directly affect the owner's bottom line.
The property owner's expectations are shaped by incomplete or
incorrect assumptions and operating principles. Constitutional
property then may give those investment-backed expectations
protection under the Takings Clause, raising the costs to the
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-16 (1922);
Butler, supra note 49, at 1264. Though Justice Holmes wrote the majority
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-16 (recognizing what is now called
a regulatory taking), he also penned a dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[A] constitution is not intended to embody
a particular economic theory . . ."), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
121. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-16; Butler, supra note 49, at
1264.
122. See William D. Nordhaus, A New Solution: The Climate Club, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, June 10, 2015 (reviewing GERNOT WAGNER & MARTIN L. WEITZMAN,
CLIMATE SHOCK (2015)), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/06/04/new-
solution-climate-clubl.
123. See id.
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government and the rest of society for handling the impacts.12 4
Rather than treating these expectations as reasonable, courts must
recognize that they arise in an "unsettled" world that will require
significant adaptation and change.1 25
Because property provides everyday ordering to American social
and legal systems in ways that are affecting the integrity of the whole,
it is imperative that the property system makes the changes needed
to help address climate change and deal more effectively with
systemic harms that attack the whole. A critical inquiry thus involves
determining whether Western-style property systems can adjust in
ways that will limit property's contributions to climate change.
III. PROPERTY'S ABILITY TO CHANGE
Is it possible for the American system of property to change, and
remove or significantly restrict, those features of property that enable
climate change to continue largely unchecked by the system?
Answering that question will require a discussion of how property law
normally adapts and whether those processes can accommodate the
necessary adjustments. Could any legal concepts or systemic
approaches thwart efforts to change? Do core justifications for change
overcome any of these barriers? Finally, what changes in the property
system must occur to address property's role as an enabler of climate
change?
A. Property's Processes for Change
Given the strong scientific consensus on the severity of the
climate change problem and on humans' role in causing the
problem,126 it is clear that climate change raises powerful questions
about property's norms, values, and principles and about whether
property can change in ways that address its contributions to the
problem. Like any other complex system, property must have an
inherent ability to be sensitive to feedbacks and to respond to those
signals in order to persist over time.12 7 The American property
system has shown that adaptability in the past, changing formally
through legislative and judicial action, and informally through
market transactions, social practices, customs, and other informal or
extralegal devices. As the following discussion explains, key formal
124. Butler, supra note 42, at 876-82.
125. See generally Victor B. Flatt, Unsettled: How Climate Change Challenges
a Foundation of Our Legal System, and Adapting the Legal State, 2016 BYU L.
REV. 1395 (2016) (advocating for a reexamination of the static parts of the legal
system).
126. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text; see also ROMM, supra note
2, at 7.
127. See THOMAS PRINCEN, THE LOGIC OF SUFFICIENCY 35 (2005) ("Change is
inherent in complex adaptive systems."). Without change, complex systems
become obsolete over time.
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and informal processes have allowed the property system to address
changing physical and social conditions, both foreseeable and
unexpected. Though climate change poses more severe risks to
fundamental biophysical and social systems than past problems,
property is a dynamic system that has the ability to adapt in
significant ways.
1. Formal Processes
Formal change through the courts occurs incrementally and on
an ex post basis. Though judicial change is incremental, courts can
have a major impact on property law by making course corrections
and updating expectations and obligations to reflect real-world
conditions. These changes may occur through recognition of new
property interests, redistribution of interests for equitable reasons, or
management of complex resource situations through a governance
strategy that involves greater judicial intervention than what occurs
under the exclusion-based approach.
Courts are guided by the core norm of efficiency to make
allocation decisions about recognition of new property interests or the
reshaping of existing interests.128 Mortgages, for example, evolved
over time to allow parties to become homeowners when personal
assets were insufficient or to capture some of the land's market value,
promoting efficient investment in land and other resources.1
29 The
property owner's right to transfer has justified invalidation of direct
restraints on alienation because of the importance of alienation to
efficient use of resources.13 0 Courts also did not allow form to prevail
over substance when serious free-rider problems existed under the
traditional approach to real covenants. For example, a New York
court allowed a homeowner's association to enforce a covenant to pay
a maintenance fee against a homeowner even though the association
did not own any land in the subdivision and thus could not technically
meet the privity of estate requirement for a covenant to run with the
land at law. 131 Courts also have modified remedial rights of property
128. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property, 57 AM. EcoN. REV.
347, 350 (1967) (postulating that property rights develop in response to
inefficiencies in existing arrangements).
129. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 560-69 (5th ed. 2017); see also
Farber, supra note 41, at 31 ("Just as property law long ago devised the mortgage
as a way to meet the pressing need for secured loans against property, so too it is
likely to find new ways to meet social needs in the era of climate change.").
130. See, e.g., Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82, Indep. Order of Odd Fellows v.
Toscano, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816, 817 (Ct. App. 1967) ("Conditions restraining
alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void." (quoting CAL. CIV.
CODE § 711 (West 1872))); RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (3d
ed. 1986) (discussing the importance of alienation to efficiency).
131. See Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15
N.E.2d 793, 798 (N.Y. 1938) ("Only blind adherence to an ancient formula devised
to meet entirely different conditions could constrain the court to hold that a
corporation formed as a medium for the enjoyment of common rights of property
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owners when the benefits to society far outweighed the costs to the
aggrieved property owner. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 132 for
instance, the New York Court of Appeals decided that the gross
economic disparity between the costs of issuing an injunction to
protect the property owner from substantial harm and the costs of
allowing the nuisance to continue with the payment of permanent
damages justified the court's departure from the traditional rule of
awarding an injunction upon proof of substantial harm.133 Further,
in contrast to the requirements for a trespass action, courts have
decided to require substantial injury before a landowner can prevail
in a nuisance action, reasoning that progress may reasonably require
some inconvenience and annoyance.134
Common law property also uses certain straightforward
operating principles to define methods of acquiring original
ownership and resolve priority disputes among rights holders. These
principles work efficiently in dealing with a wide variety of situations
by relying on common sense concepts like physical possession and
first in time that are flexible and relatively easy to apply. Discovery
and the rule of capture both rely on the first-in-time principle as the
basis of original ownership in previously unowned resources.135 Over
time, the courts have refined these operating principles as the nature
of the resource, technological advances, and other circumstances have
changed.136 The courts also adopted the concept of relativity of title
owners owns no property which would benefit by enforcement of common rights
and has no cause of action in equity to enforce the covenant upon which such
common rights depend. . . . In substance if not in form the covenant is a
restrictive covenant which touches and concerns the defendant's land, and in
substance, if not in form, there is privity of estate between the plaintiff and the
defendant.").
132. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
133. See id. at 874 (awarding permanent damages instead of an injunction
because of the gross disparity between the economic consequences of the nuisance
on the landowner and an injunction on the public interest).
134. See, e.g., Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1381, 1384 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1982); see also Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 222
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (distinguishing between trespass and nuisance).
135. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587-89 (1823) (holding that though
the Native American tribes were the rightful occupants of the land in dispute,
the tribes could not convey the land to the plaintiffs because mere occupancy does
not signify ownership; rather, European settlers, as first discoverers, had the
exclusive right to appropriate the lands occupied by the Native Americans); see
also Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding that the
owner of ferae naturae is the first hunter to capture the wild animal on
unappropriated lands, not merely to pursue it).
136. In Pierson, for example, the court discussed how the meaning of the rule
of capture had been expanded from corporeal possession to mortal wounding by
one not abandoning pursuit. See Pierson, 3 Cai. at 178-79. In Hinman v. Pacific
Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1936), the court recognized the
importance of new technology by redefining the ad coelum doctrine to allow
airplane flights that did not unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment
of lands lying below the flight path.
30 [Vol. 55
PROPERTY'S PROBLEM WITH EXTREMES
to allow the rights and obligations of parties in resources to vary
depending on the relation of the parties in time and space. The first
finder, for example, prevails over a subsequent finder but loses to the
true owner under traditional common law,13 7 while a downstream
riparian owner's rights are subject to the reasonable uses of upstream
riparians.138 The doctrine of merger is also used to clean up the title
when a party with a limited interest in a tract later acquires the
remaining ownership interests; this doctrine has long been a means
for reconciling the interests of a landowner with those of a
community's. 139
When norms of fairness and justice demand equitable relief,
courts have instead changed the distribution of property or property-
like interests. Courts have allowed the good faith improver to keep
the improved property when the improver's labor has significantly
transformed property not owned by the improver and added much
value. 140 Under similar thinking, a minor building encroachment
made in good faith may be allowed to remain when it does not affect
the actual landowner's use and grave hardship would result if
removal were ordered.141 Further, an oral license to use land in a
certain manner may become irrevocable if the landowner knowingly
allows the user to expend money and labor to conduct or maintain the
use.142 And equity may provide permanent relief against a permitted
137. See Armory v. Delamirie (1722) 1 Str. 505, 505 (K.B.); see also SINGER,
supra note 129, at 824-29.
138. See Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian
Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47
U. PITT. L. REV. 95, 124-30 (1985). For example, domestic uses of water usually
take higher priority than others. See id. at 126, 126 n.83; see also A. DAN TARLOCK
& JASON ANTHONY ROBISON,-LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3:60 (2019).
139. See Stuart Banner, Murr and Merger, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS.
CONF. J. 185, 191-92 (2018) (discussing how the merger doctrine helps to
reconcile title with a community); Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of
Merger, 40 VAND. L. REV. 283, 284 (1987) (discussing use of the merger doctrine
to clean up title).
140. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 316-22 (1871) (finding that
defendant, who in good faith made barrel hoops from timber cut on plaintiffs
land, had transformed the wood to the extent that its original identity was
destroyed and its value enhanced, and therefore the original owner could not
reclaim it).
141. See, e.g., Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595-96 (Colo. 1951)
(holding that, although the foundation and footings of defendant's building
extended two to three and a half inches onto plaintiffs land, the encroachment
was unintentional and slight and therefore not requiring removal of the offending
encroachment; "plaintiffs use [was] not affected and his damage small and fairly
compensable, while the cost of removal is so great as to cause grave hardship or
otherwise make its removal unconscionable").
142. See, e.g., Richardson v. Franc, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 853, 856 (Ct. App. 2015)
("[I]t would be inequitable to deny respondents an irrevocable license given their
substantial investment of time and money on the landscaping and other
improvements and appellants' years of acquiescence."); Holbrook v. Taylor, 532
S.W.2d 763, 764, 766 (Ky. 1976) (holding that where a plaintiff landowner
312020]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
use conducted randomly and intermittently on another's land when
the use causes injury.143
Despite the more limited management focus of the exclusion-
based approach, courts have, on occasion, transformed direct property
relationships by looking beyond the traditional purposes of the
relationship to current social or physical conditions.1 4 4 In the 1960s
and 1970s, for instance, courts rebalanced the landlord/tenant
relationship to recognize the need for a more complex governance
approach that reflected the new roles of the landlord and the tenant,
the changed expectations accompanying those roles, and the poor
housing conditions existing in many urban rental markets.145 Some
influential courts recognized that modern residential leaseholds
involve complicated mechanical systems, that residential tenants no
longer have the skills or access needed to handle major repairs, and
that the tenants expected a place to live that was habitable in some
basic ways.1 4 6 Because of the change in expectations and in housing
allowed defendants use of a roadway on his land to gain access to their home from
the public highway, "to take in heavy equipment and material and supplies for
construction of the residence, [to perform] general improvement of the premises,
the maintenance of the roadway, and the construction by appellees of a $25,000
residence, all with the actual consent of appellants or at least with their tacit
approval," "the ... [plaintiff] may not revoke the license and restore his premises
to their former condition after the [defendant] has exercised the privilege given
by the license and erected the improvements at considerable expense" (quoting
Lashley Tel. Co. v. Durbin, 228 S.W. 423, 423 (Ky. 1921))). An oral agreement o
conduct a use on another's land similarly may be recognized as an easement,
despite the absence of a deed, when the user detrimentally relies on the oral
agreement to expend money and labor. See Baseball Publ'g Co. v. Bruton, 18
N.E.2d 362, 365 (Mass. 1938).
143. See, e.g., Baker v. Howard Cty. Hunt, 188 A. 223, 230 (Md. 1936)
("[W]here it appears that the defendant manifests an intention of persisting in
the perpetration of unlawful acts, the expense, annoyance, and trouble of
prosecuting numerous actions at law to recover trifling damages render an action
at law an inadequate remedy.... [I]t is long since settled that equity will relieve
against continuing or repeated trespasses committed in pursuance of a single
plan or purpose." (citations omitted)).
144. For the most part, the courts focus on direct relationships between the
owners and parties in their chain of title or having interests in the same property
and between the owners and neighboring landowners in close proximity. See
supra text accompanying note 47.
145. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir.
1970) ("In our judgment the common law itself must recognize the landlord's
obligation to keep his premises in a habitable condition. . .. The common law rule
absolving the lessor of all obligation to repair originated in the early Middle Ages.
Such a rule was perhaps well suited to an agrarian economy; the land was more
important than whatever small living structure was included in the leasehold,
and the tenant farmer was fully capable of making repairs himself."); Brown v.
Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 836-37 (D.C. 1968) (holding that a tenant's
lease was invalid and no rent was owed because the landlord rented premises
that were not "safe and sanitary" in violation of the law).
146. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-
Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 505 (1982).
32 [Vol. 55
PROPERTY'S PROBLEM WITH EXTREMES
construction, as well as the public health concerns raised by poor
living conditions, those courts implied a warranty of habitability into
residential leases.147 Eventually, legislatures followed the
groundbreaking path of the courts by enacting various versions of the
Uniform Landlord/Tenant Act. 148
Courts have also used common law doctrines to manage property
relationships when those relationships are based on conditions that
have become obsolete or do not reflect fundamental changes in legal
and social norms. Restrictive covenants may be terminated because
of changed circumstances in the restricted area that make fulfillment
of the covenant impossible149 or because of significant changes in the
law or in physical conditions.150 The common law governing property
rights in shore lands similarly developed adaptive doctrines to
address changes due to natural processes.15 1 Under the doctrines of
erosion and accretion, gradual and imperceptible changes in the shore
lands result in a fluctuating boundary between private and public
rights.15 2 This low-cost approach avoids the almost impossible task
of having to determine the original boundary's location-had it
remained the legal boundary despite the slowly shifting sands,
allowing the waterfront landowner and the public to rely on
147. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1076-77 ("In our judgment, the old no-repair
rule cannot coexist with the obligations imposed on the landlord by a typical
modern housing code, and must be abandoned in favor of an implied warranty of
habitability.").
148. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT ACT §§ 2.104, 4.101 (NAT'L CONF.
COMM'RS UNIF. ST. LAws 1972); see, e.g., VIRGINIA RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD &
TENANT ACT, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55.1-1200-55.1-1262 (2019).
149. See Bolotin v. Rindge, 41 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (noting
that "[a] court will declare deed restrictions to be unenforceable when, by reason
of changed conditions, enforcement of the restrictions would be inequitable and
oppressive, and would harass plaintiff without benefiting the adjoining owners").
150. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) ("Whatever else the
framers sought to achieve, it is clear that the matter of primary concern [in
enacting the Fourteenth Amendment] was the establishment of equality in the
enjoyment of basic civil and political rights and the preservation of those rights
from discriminatory action on the part of the States based on considerations of
race or color."); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409 (1915) (noting that,
though petitioner acquired the land before the area had been annexed to the city
of Los Angeles, "the district [the legislation] created had become primarily a
residential section and that the occupants of the neighboring dwellings are
seriously incommoded by the operations of petitioner," and because the
legislation did not operate discriminatorily or arbitrarily, the city did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting the legislation that forbid petitioner
from brickmaking within city limits).
151. See, e.g., Gunderson v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1186-87 (Ind. 2018).
152. As a beach erodes, the waterfront landowner loses land and the
government gains it. See TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 138, § 3:35 (noting that
"[s]tates have long asserted a strong interest in promoting access to coastal
waters for navigation . . . and recreational purposes . . . . For these reasons, title
to the beds under navigable waters is generally vested in the states").
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observable high and low water marks.1 5 3 Sudden change, however, is
not a risk that the waterfront landowner bears, for the change is
easily noticeable and thus the legal boundary remains the same under
the doctrine of avulsion.154 The waterfront landowner can even
reclaim identified shore land lost suddenly.155
Now that many coastal areas are facing unrelenting sea level
rise,156 waterfront landowners need to confront the reality of losing
their interests in shore land whenever the loss is due to the slow and
imperceptible rise in the seas.157 When waterfront landowners who
have gradually lost shore lands to sea level rise have sued to enjoin
the public from using areas now below the high water mark, courts
have tended to reject their claims under the common law doctrines of
accretion and erosion.1 5 8 Similarly, when waterfront landowners
have sued the government for just compensation after being denied a
permit to build a hardened erosion control structure, courts have
tended to rule against the landowners, reasoning that natural
processes-not he regulatory ban or permit denial-caused the
loss. 1 5 9 Given that the seas are progressively rising due to climate
153. See id.
154. See id. § 3:42.
155. See id. §§ 3:42-3:43; see also Walton Cty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment,
Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1117 (Fla. 2008), (citing 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW
OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 74 (1904) ("If a portion of the land of the riparian
[or littoral] owner is suddenly engulfed, and the former boundary can be
determined or the land reclaimed within a reasonable time, he does not lose his
title to it.")), affd 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
156. In its 2014 report, the Union of Concerned Scientists predicted that sea-
level rise will cause frequent, widespread tidal flooding over the next fifteen to
thirty years across the East and Gulf Coasts and estimated that "two-thirds of
these [coastal] communities could see a tripling or more in the number of high-
tide floods each year" in that time. ERIKA SPANGLER-SIEGFRIED ET AL.,
ENCROACHING TIDES: How SEA LEVEL RISE AND TIDAL FLOODING THREATEN U.S.
EAST AND GULF COAST COMMUNITIES OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS 2, 10-11, 22 (2014),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2014/10/encroaching-tides-full-
report.pdf. The report anticipated that the mid-Atlantic coast can expect to see
the greatest increase in frequency: by 2030, the region could experience floods
more than once a week, "an average of 80 to 130 tidal floods a year." Id. at 2, 16-
18. By 2045, Washington, D.C. may see nearly four hundred tidal floods per year.
Id. at 7, 22. And population-dense, low-lying areas like Miami are especially
vulnerable to sea-level rise; the report predicts the "frequency of tidal flooding [in
Miami] to increase nearly eightfold." Id. at 32-33.
157. See J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property
Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 80 (2012).
158. See id. at 79-82; see also Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 831 N.E.2d 865,
868, 872-75 (Mass. 2005) (holding that a ban on residential development was not
a taking because, among other reasons, the coastal land was prone to severe
flooding).
159. See City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 547-55 (N.J. 2010)
(concluding that the landowner lost beachfront property due to an avulsive event
under state common law and therefore that the government owned the restored
beach); Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406, 414-15
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a ban on the use of permanent erosion control
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change, it may be time to recognize the necessity of reforming the
legal regime governing coastal lands to reflect the realities of climate
change.
Further, American property law already employs flexible and
adaptive common law principles to deal with certain complex
relationships involving shared and common resources. Significantly,
in defining the rights and obligations of private waterfront
landowners, the public, and the government with respect o navigable
waters and related lands, courts have developed different definitions
of navigability to address distinct jurisdictional and legal situations.
Navigability, for federal jurisdictional purposes, is tied to the federal
government's constitutionally based power over commerce and
governs the allocation of title to submerged beds between federal and
state governments.16 0 State law definitions of navigability, however,
may further determine how and whether the public may use
waterways and their submerged beds, as well as the extent of
ownership rights of waterfront landowners.161 A watercourse that is
not navigable in fact for commerce under federal law may
nevertheless be navigable under state law for recreational and other
public uses.162 State courts adopting an expanded view of
navigability for purposes of determining public use rights in
watercourses have explained that the meaning of navigability varies
according to the function being served.16 3 Although the federal
definition of navigability is tied to the Commerce Clause,16 4 state
definitions serve a different purpose-to balance the rights of private
waterfront landowners with the use rights of the public.1 6 5 This long-
standing ability of the courts to govern complex relationships among
numerous stakeholders demonstrates the inherent ability of property
to adapt, to be flexible, and to respond to current conditions.
In a functioning political system, legislative action can provide
more comprehensive change to property law. The problem of climate
structure on a barrier island was not a taking when the harm to the property was
caused by natural processes of erosion and migration of water); McQueen v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003) (holding that the denial of a
permit to build a bulkhead was not a compensable taking because natural forces
caused the erosion and conversion to wetlands).
160. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197-98 (1824); Lynda L. Butler,
Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public Property, 9 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 323, 337, 337 n.75 (1990). For a discussion of allocation of title, see
id. at 338.
161. See Butler, supra note 160, at 338.
162. See id. at 338-39.
163. See, e.g., State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Ark. 1980) ("It is the
policy of [Arkansas] to encourage the use of its water courses for any useful or
beneficial purpose. There may be other public uses than the carrying on of
commerce of pecuniary value." (quoting Barboro v. Boyle, 178 S.W, 378, 380
(1915))); see also Butler, supra note 160, at 338-39, 338 n.81.
164. See Butler, supra note 160, at 337.
165. See id. at 338-40.
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change, however, has become too politicized an issue for some state
and federal legislatures to address.166 For reasons that cannot
possibly reflect the facts and findings of climate science, some
politicians have denied the existence of the problem, often after
accepting support from fossil fuel companies.167 These politicians
have not only refused to take action but have also limited the ability
of others to act.168 Some companies have even run campaigns of
disinformation about climate change to cast doubt about the existence
of the problem and about the scientists supporting action.1 6 9
ExxonMobil, for instance, funded research by outside scientists both
to contradict the research of its own scientists after they had found a
connection between fossil fuel burning and climate change and also
166. See Peter Howard & Michael A. Livermore, Sociopolitical Feedbacks and
Climate Change, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 163 (2019) (discussing the failure
to address climate change legislation because of partisan deadlock); Carlos
Anchondo, Once Again, Bills to Study the Impact of Climate Change in Texas
Have Stalled, TEX. TRIB. (May 10, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org
/2019/05/10/climate-change-bills-do-not-get-hearings-this-session-in-texas/
(discussing Texas legislature's failure to address bills to study climate change
because of political polarization).
167. See Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, How G.O.P. Leaders Came to View
Climate Change as Fake Science, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/us/politics/republican-leaders-cimate-
change.html (examining the effect of fossil fuel campaign contributions on
politicians denying climate change).
168. In North Carolina, for example, the state legislature decided to limit the
ability of state agencies and local governments to address one impact of climate
change-sea level rise-by prohibiting the use of up-to-date flood data; instead,
"the law restrict[ed] all sea-level predictions used to guide state policies" through
2016 to "those based on 'historical data."' See Alon Harish, New Law in North
Carolina Bans Latest Scientific Predictions of Sea-Level Rise, ABC NEWS (Aug. 2,
2012, 12:54 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/north-carolina-banslatest-science-
rising-sea-level/story?id=16913782; Jane J. Lee, Legislating Sea Level Rise, Scl.
MAG. (June 12, 2012, 6:15 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2012/06
/legislating-sea-level-rise.
Several bills to limit the use of science also have been introduced at the federal
level. See, e.g., Honest and Open New EPA Science Treatment ("HONEST") Act
of 2017, H.R. 1430, 115th Cong. (2017) (prohibiting the EPA from "proposing,
finalizing, or disseminating regulations or assessments based upon scientific
evidence that is not transparent or reproducible"). According to the House
Report, "covered" EPA actions cannot be disseminated unless the information
used in decision-making can be "specifically identified" and is "publicly available
in a manner sufficient for independent analysis and scientific replication." H.R.
REP. No. 115-59, at 2, 9 (2017). This bill would effectively prevent reliance on
medical studies that rely on confidential personal information or on monitoring
a person's health over time. See Better Evaluation of Science and Technology
("BEST') Act, S. 578, 115th Cong. (2017) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 553 to include
limitations regarding the use of scientific information in rule making).
169. See James Weinstein, Climate Change Disinformation, Citizen
Competence, and the First Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 342-43 (2018)
(examining Exxon's disinformation campaign that attempted to cast doubt on
climate change and the scientists that support it).
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to shape public opinion about climate change.170 Given the paralysis
within Congress and other legislative bodies, judicial action may, at
the present time, be the only viable method for refocusing the
property system on its contributions to climate change and on
rewiring the incentive structure of property.
2. Informal Processes
Property law can also change informally as social practices and
market incentives reshape norms and preferences. Sometimes
changes in property rules result from a society's long-standing
resistance to formal rules imposed on them.171 Eventually, the
informal practices developed in reaction to the formal system may
form the basis of new property rules. One telling example of this
evolutionary path involves settlers in the American colonies who
resisted England's imposition of the feudal system, with all of its
complicated rules, conditions, and obligations. In colonial Virginia,
for instance, settlers refused to pay quit rents and developed a
number of ways to circumvent limitations imposed on their ability to
acquire land rights.172 The English government reacted to the
colonists' resistance by trying different land distribution schemes-
none of which succeeded in overcoming the opposition.173 In other
situations, close-knit or homogeneous groups have informally
developed their own distinctive property system and operating rules
over time.174 The gold mining camps in California, for example,
developed their own practices for allocating, distributing, and
170. See Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Assessing ExxonMobil's Climate
Change Communications (1977-2014), 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 9, 13-15 (2017);
Ian Johnston, ExxonMobil: Oil and Gas Giant 'Misled' the Public About Climate
Change, Say Harvard Experts, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 23, 2017, 1:00 PM),
http://www.independent.co.uklenvironment/exxonmobil-climate-change-oil-gas-
fossil-fuels-global-warming-harvard-a7908541.html.
171. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Land Use and the Study of Early American
History, 94 YALE L.J. 717, 728-29 (1985) (book review) (describing changes in
colony property rules as a result of early colonist's long-standing resistance to
England's imposed limitations on land use).
172. See LYNDA LEE BUTLER & 1MARGIT LIVINGSTON, VIRGINIA TIDAL AND
COASTAL LAW § 8.1 (1988) (discussing how the colonists resisted their English
rulers' land distribution laws).
173. Id. For a suggestion that it is time for further change in American
property law, see Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457,
1479-1504 (2016).
174. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 40-64 (1991) (studying
ranchers and farmers in Shasta County and concluding that when they form a
close-knit community, they reach efficient results through informal norms and
not by bargaining around legal rules); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 26-28, 88-
102 (Canto Classics ed. 2015) (studying groups of people engaged in self-
monitoring of common-pool resources, and finding that, though each community
developed substantially different sets of rules, the rules were based on the same
underlying principles).
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managing mining rights.175 This informal system worked well
because miners in the camps were a fairly homogeneous group and
agreed on a basic principle of equal opportunity.176 Eventually, the
system became the basis of the federal approach.177 Property rules
have also evolved in the context of particular resources to provide a
source of livelihood and promote economic activities. In the
Tidewater region of Virginia, for instance, fisheries and waterfowl
were especially abundant and became critical to survival and trade.178
In part because of their importance, Virginia recognized, even during
its colonial era, certain marshlands and shore lands as common lands
subject to public rights to fish, fowl, and hunt.179 Eventually, the
commons concept was extended to various waters and shores in the
western part of the state.1 8 0
Property law can also change incrementally through marketplace
transactions as rational actors receive signals about he costs and
benefits of various options.181 Over time, these transactions may
become so prevalent that they shape expectations and become part of
property law.182 Markets, however, are not the answer to the climate
change problem, though they may become part of the solution.18 3
Markets work effectively to the extent that a correctible misallocation
of costs exists. Climate change reflects a basic failure of property
owners and societies to even see-much less understand-the costs of
greenhouse gas emitting activities.184 Among other factors, the time
scales of climate change lie outside the ability of market detection and
response. Further, institutional failures may block the changes that
are needed-changes like the creation of new rights and obligations,
the consideration of competing public interests, or the recognition of
175. GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 29-30 (James Alt
& Douglass North eds., 1989).
176. See id. at 29-34, 36-37 (discussing the evolution of private mineral rights
in open access lands by over six hundred mining camps in the West).
177. Id. at 36-37.
178. See Jack Temple Kirby, Virginia's Environmental History: A Prospectus,
99 VA. MAG. HIsT. & BIOGRAPHY 449, 449, 451, 459 (1991) (describing the
abundant fish and waterfowl trade in the Tidewater portion of Virginia).
179. See BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 172, §§ 6.1-6.2 (discussing the
development of the commons concept in England, colonial Virginia, and the
Commonwealth of Virginia).
180. Id. § 10.2 (discussing the expansion of common lands to include "banks,
shores, and beds of rivers and creeks in the western parts of this
commonwealth").
181. See Doremus, supra note 9, at 1091, 1117-19.
182. See id. at 1117.
183. See Doremus, supra note 9, at 1117-19. See generally Krugman, supra
note 54 (discussing how markets react and account for "negative externalities,"
and noting that environmental economics can help legislators deal with these
externalities).
184. See Doremus, supra note 9, at 1119; see also WRIGHT & NYBERG, supra
note 71, at 47-72 (discussing how corporations are strategically framing climate
change as a business risk and therefore an opportunity for capital growth).
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the interests of future generations.18 5 Maximizing the economic
potential of certain types of resources, like navigable waters, may
only be possible through a system based on collective rights, not
private rights, because of the increasing returns to scale that their
use generates.186  Marketplace transactions also do not deal
effectively with situations where costs are diffused among many but
are significant in the aggregate.187  Moreover, actors in the
marketplace may be biased in how they consider and value costs and
benefits, ignoring long-term costs, non-marginalized change, and
interests that are hard to value because of their complexity or
intangible nature.188 The actors generally assume the legitimacy of
current methods of production and consumption, even though those
methods have, in the case of climate change, led to the problem. 189
B. Obstacles to Change
As the prior Subpart has explained, property law has formal and
informal processes for evolving in response to changing conditions
and needs, both social and biophysical. Addressing the extreme
problem of climate change will require eliminating or modifying those
aspects of property that enable climate change to occur. What
obstacles, if any, could potentially thwart changes to common law
property that would address its enabling features? One obstacle is
the narrow incentive structure of neoliberal economics that has
become woven into the fabric of key property principles and concepts.
Another obstacle concerns current judicial interpretations of
constitutionally protected property that magnify the narrow
perspective and logic of efficiency.
185. See Doremus, supra note 9, at 1097-99 (discussing the need for a flexible
and adaptive property system with mechanisms for creating or changing property
rights).
186. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 772-73 (1986) (discussing how
treating navigable waters as a commons produces increasing returns to scale and
a comedy of the commons).
187. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1257-58, 1258 n.234; see also Doremus,
supra note 9, at 1119 (explaining that free rider problems lead to market
inefficiencies, such as the underproviding of public goods).
188. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1257-58 (discussing the negative
externalities of the American property system and how the economic theory of
property "generally lacks the incentives to manage for resilience"); see also James
Y. Stern, The Essential Structure of Property Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1167, 1186
(2017) (discussing the difficulty of valuing future interests in an estate because
the eventual right is not distinctly a property right); Krugman, supra note 54
(suggesting some reasons why the costs of action or inaction may be hard to value
in the climate change context because of the uncertainty of the magnitude of the
problem, climate inertia, and the delay of seeing any benefits until the future).
See generally STEPHEN M. GARDINER, A PERFECT MORAL STORM 247-98 (2011)
(evaluating the use of cost-benefit analysis in the climate change context).
189. See WRIGHT & NYBERG, supra note 71, at 51-54, 60-64 (asserting that
risk management practices legitimize corporate approaches to climate change).
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1. The Incentive Structure of Property
Common law property operates effectively in part because of a
number of options embedded in the system's default rules. Those
embedded options make strategic choices that guide decision-
making.190 The choices, for example, make assumptions about the
allocation of risk between buyers and sellers of real estate when
casualty loss occurs during the transition period between execution of
the contract for sale and the closing.191 Similarly, embedded options
allocate gains and losses between landlord and tenant during the
lease1 92 and "include a preference for [both] private ordering" and
individual rights over public or common interests.1 9 3 As the economic
theory of property has gained dominance, it has shaped and
influenced the options and assumptions embedded in property's
structure, directing decision-making along the normative path of
efficiency and away from other paths.194 That is, economic incentives
have become part of property's fabric, framing the choices of the
gatekeeper-the property owner-consistent with the assumptions of
neoliberal economics.
- The mainstream economic theory of property, however, takes a
narrow perspective that favors economic over noneconomic values
and individual over collective interests. Further, since the bundle of
sticks conception of property has gained acceptance, the focus of the
common law has shifted more towards the owner's economic interests
in particular sticks in the bundle.195 Indeed, legal principles shaping
property rights or resolving property conflicts are often analyzed
within the confines of economic thinking, regardless of the nature of
the problem.196 Literature on neoliberal economics suggests that the
190. See Butler, supra note 42, at 885.
191. But see 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITIONS § 93.09 (2019)
(describing how, in real property transactions, the parties, often by contract (or
by other means, such as insurance, or state law), allocate the risk of loss due to
casualty in the executory period differently). See generally 14 POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 81.03 (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2019) (discussing allocation of risk
between buyer and seller in a real estate transaction).
192. See Lee Anne Fennell, Options for Owners and Outlaws, 1 BRIGHAM-
KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 239, 239-40 (2012); see, e.g., Smith v. McEnany, 48
N.E. 781, 781 (Mass. 1897) (discussing allocation of risk under a lease).
193. Butler, supra note 42, at 885-86; see also David Kennedy, Some Caution
About Property Rights as a Recipe for Economic Development, 1 ACCT., EcON., &
L. 1, 21-22, 34 (2011) (discussing the complex relationship between private and
public ordering).
194. See Butler, supra note 42, at 886.
195. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS
To U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 2-5 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 2010) (describing economic
analysis of property rights as well as general "bundle of sticks" analysis); Butler,
supra note 42, at 876-82 (analyzing the coupling of the mainstream economic
theory of property and constitutional property).
196. See WRIGHT & NYBERG, supra note 71, at 187-89 (discussing market-
based solutions for climate change); Demsetz, supra note 128, at 347-49
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modern system of capital is a perpetually functioning machine,
operating without integration with other systems (legal or
otherwise).19 7 Natural systems are treated as part of the capital stock
of property owners-as free gifts of nature generally entitling the
owners to use nature's resources in promoting their individual
economic interests.1 9 8 Property rights, in other words, depend on the
"ongoing consumption of the natural world that we depend on for
survival."199 Yet a dollar bill does not have intrinsic value in and of
itself but rather is symbolic, conveying information that interacts
with other systems-with labor, economic, and natural systems.
Instead of considering Earth as the constraining system, property and
economic systems view nature as a bundle of valuable assets available
to owners to exploit, commodify, and use. No general duty to preserve
the integrity of vital biophysical systems is recognized.200 Though
economic analysis is an important method for evaluating options and
considering relevant factors, it should not exclude other important
values from the decision-making process, ignore constraints imposed
by other systems, or assume that other interests can be measured
accurately in monetary and economic terms.
The embedded options now shaped by the mainstream economic
theory ignore the complex relations often existing in shared
resources. Outward-regarding interests are generally promoted only
to the extent that they are consistent with economic preferences.
Many shared resources and systems are important to the ecological
integrity of biophysical systems. The health of the climate system,
for example, is critical to the survival of the human species. Like
other aspects of the American legal system, however, property law
has failed to recognize the importance of imposing legal
accountability for knowingly contributing to the degradation of the
climate system.201 Complex relations in shared resources require a
more nuanced approach than that provided by the economic theory of
(discussing the role that economic principles play in the development of property
rights).
197. See WILLIAm E. CONNOLLY, THE FRAGILITY OF THINGS 7, 11-12, 20-42
(2013) (discussing the impact of neoliberalism on human and biophysical
systems).
198. WRIGHT & NYBERG, supra note 71, at 186-90.
199. Id. at 187.
200. Id. at 188-89.
201. Indeed, the Trump Administration continues to deny the energy
industry's contributions to climate change. This is particularly apparent in the
nomination of Kathleen Hartnett-White, a vocal climate change skeptic, to chair
the Council on Environmental Quality. See Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney,
Trump Taps Climate Skeptic for Top White House Environmental Post, WASH.
POST (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/10/13/trump-taps-climate-skeptic-for-top-white-house-
environmental-post/. As of October 2017, the administration also had sought to
reverse more than sixty environmental rules, which could have dangerous effects
on climate protection. See Popovich et al., supra note 36.
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property rights. Because of the limitations of the economic approach,
changes that can address property's enabling features will need to
reach into the incentive structure of property to shape the operation
of property rules on a daily basis.
2. Constitutionally Protected Property
Constitutional protection of property under the Takings Clause
magnifies the economic incentives of the dominant mainstream
approach to property. At its core, takings jurisprudence emphasizes
an exclusion-based view of property that centers on the right to
exclude and the sovereign-like power to decide how to use the
property.202 This jurisprudence includes two categorical rules for
identifying compensable takings that do not require further inquiry
into the public interest when the rules are triggered.203 One applies
whenever a government action causes a physical invasion of private
property, no matter how small.2 04  The second arises when a
government action deprives an owner of all economically viable
use.20 5 These categorical rules allow courts to ignore the public
interest that justifies the government action in conducting takings
analysis and thus to magnify the focus of the mainstream approach
on the owner's economic interests. Left out of the equation is any
consideration of important third party or public interests affected by
the property owner's decisions.
Property's tradition of encouraging productive use has also
strengthened the ties between the economic theory of property and
constitutionally protected property.206 Regulatory takings analysis,
in particular, focuses on the economic impact of government acts on
the property owners. As Justice Scalia explained in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,20 7 the right to conduct aA economically
viable use is part of the "historical compact" reflected in the Takings
Clause.208 To guard that compact, the majority in Lucas adopted a
categorical rule finding a compensable taking whenever a
government act totally deprives a property owner of economically
viable use unless the legal restriction "inhere[s] in the title itself." 209
With a Lucas situation, then, the economic interests of the property
owner are elevated over public interests and are automatically given
constitutional stature. The Court considers that stature to be
202. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-18 (1992).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1015.
205. Id. at 1015-16.
206. See Butler, supra note 42, at 881-82 (discussing property's focus on
productive use).
207. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
208. See id. at 1028.
209. Id. at 1028-29.
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functionally equivalent to a physical taking of property.210 A public
interest as compelling as climate change would not even be considered
under the categorical thinking of Lucas; the property owner's right to
exploit and profit from her bundle of sticks would prevail under the
Takings Clause-just as the right to possess is protected from a
permanent physical occupation no matter how small.
Coupling the economic interests of property owners with
constitutional protection through such a one-dimensional per se rule
unnecessarily creates a serious obstacle to addressing climate change.
If the economic interests of property owners retain this one-
dimensional type of protection, efforts to address the extreme problem
of climate change could bankrupt federal, state, and local
governments.21 1 Providing such protection ignores the history of the
Takings Clause. Initially, the only type of compensable taking was a
physical appropriation or occupation.212 Instead of evaluating the
economic interests of property owners, early decisions of the Supreme
Court asked whether a permanent, physical invasion or occupation
had occurred.2 13  As physical takings claims involved less
permanence, less physicality, and less directness, the Court
developed a more nuanced framework for analysis that included the
character of the government action, the impact on use value, and the
importance of the public interest.214 The history of constitutionally
protected property involved an ongoing struggle between public and
private ordering of rights in resources-a struggle about the
210. This functional equivalence logic comes from Justice Holmes's opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
211. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL
EcoNOMIC EFFECTS COULD HELP GUIDE FEDERAL EFFORTS TO REDUCE FISCAL
EXPOSURE 1 (2017).
212. See MORTON J. HORwITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860 63-67 (1979) (discussing the history of just compensation for physical
takings in the United States); Butler, supra note 42, at 883; John F. Hart, Land
Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause,
94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1099-101 (2000) (concluding that the conventional
history of early American land use law is misplaced and wrong); William Michael
Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695-98 (1985) (noting that
colonial laws and early statehood constitutions did not recognize a right to just
compensation). See Lynda L. Butler, The Governance Function of Constitutional
Property, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2015) (describing the history of
constitutional protection of property and the shifts in approaches to physical
takings).
213. Butler, supra note 212, at 1689.
214. Id. at 1722-23; see HORWITZ, supra note 212, at 66, 71-74, 84-85, 97-99
(discussing the relationship between the gradual acceptance of the compensation
principle and the development of takings principles). Noxious use cases provide
excellent examples of how important public interests affected the Court's
analysis. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1915); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662-66 (1887); see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 420-21 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing the importance
of the public interest).
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appropriate mix of collective and private interests given current
socioeconomic, political, and ecological conditions.2 15
Further, if the coupling of the economic theory of property with
constitutionally protected property continues, a federal dimension
will be further injected into the common law of property to the point
where the operating rules of property will be fundamentally altered
on a national level. State law traditionally has defined the basic rules
and principles governing property rights.2 16  These rules have
operated without much fanfare, percolating up from the ground as
property conflicts have arisen. By imposing a top-down approach
controlled by federal constitutional norms, the Supreme Court will
redirect the operation of property principles away from the states to
the federal approach, with its more limiting normative path of
efficiency. The embedded options of the economic vision will control
the definition of property on a national level, leading to greater
rigidity in the formal system as the options frame the meaning of
state property law.2 1 7 The flexibility of a bottom-up approach and the
experimentation by fifty states will be lost, along with property's
ability to look beyond efficiency.2 18 Property's capacity to evolve and
respond to crises in natural and man-made systems thus will be
further limited.
The Court, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
recognized an important exception to its categorical rule for any
restrictions that "inhere in the title itself'-in background principles
of common law property and nuisance.219 The fallacy of this exception
for background principles is that it ignores real-time background
facts, focusing instead on legal principles formed at a certain point in
time. Suppose, for example, that years ago Lucas had instead bought
a tract of coastal land not located in a subdivision apd consisting
largely of a beach area and salt marshes. If Lucas were denied a
permit to fill the marshlands because of significant adverse effects
that would result to neighboring lands from losing the flood protection
services of coastal marshes, a claim that Lucas was denied all
economically viable use likely would prevail under Scalia's analysis.
Since the Lucas categorical rule is defined in the context of traditional
legal principles, there appears to be no room for considering
background facts that should - inform application of the legal
principles-facts like the nature of the property and the now-
understood functions performed by marshlands, including protection
of the upland from storm surge, sea level rise, and erosion. Yet
215. Lee Anne Fennell, Ostrom's Law: Property Rights in the Commons, 5
INT'L J. COMMONS 9, 16-17 (2011); Kennedy, supra note 193, at 21-23.
216. See Hart, supra note 212, at 1130-31.
217. See Butler, supra note 42, at 886.
218. For further discussion of the dangers of coupling, see id. at 883-90.
219. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992).
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shouldn't the character of a tract of land be an inherent limitation-
or at least a relevant consideration-under a Lucas analysis?
The Court's reliance on the common law of nuisance and property
as a source of background principles also locks takings analysis in
time,220 and in ways that hinder efforts to address severe collective
action problems like climate change. Adherence to the common law
doctrines governing gains and losses in coastal lands through
accretion and erosion, for example, would mean that coastal
landowners will always lose to public rights when the change is
gradual and imperceptible as in the case of sea level rise. Under the
doctrine of accretion, the boundary between private and public rights
moves gradually with the tides.221 But if the change is sudden-for
example, from a storm-the doctrine of avulsion dictates that the
boundary remains fixed and allows the property owner to try to
identify and recover the lost shore land.2 2 2 The assumption of those
common law doctrines is that the gains and losses of gradual change
will even out over time.223 Now that sea levels are rising in most
coastal areas, the tidal boundaries will gradually but continuously
move landward until they eventually overcome the private
landowners' improvements. Though it would make sense to
reevaluate the common law doctrines in light of the changing
biophysical conditions, Justice Scalia stressed in Lucas that the
common law principles governing property could not change and
evolve through the courts.224 Yet, if the courts had the ability to
revise common law principles when the interests of private property
owners were threatened, then surely the courts should have the
ability to update common law principles when the exercise of property
rights under the current incentive structure threatens the earth's
biosphere. A rigid approach would box in the courts in an
unproductive way. The founding fathers never envisioned that the
earth's climate system would be so detrimentally affected by
greenhouse gas emissions.225 Courts must have an obligation to
220. This is one of Justice Stevens's objections to the majority's approach in
Lucas. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064-67 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("[B]ecause of the
elastic nature of property rights, the Court's new rule will also prove unsound in
practice . . . . [T]he Court emphasizes that because total takings are 'relatively
rare' its new rule will not adversely affect the government's ability to 'go
on' .... The Court's suggestion only begs the question of why regulations of this
particular class should always be found to effect takings.").
221. Byrne, supra note 157, at 80.
222. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560
U.S. 702, 710-11, 730-33 (2010).
223. See Byrne, supra note 157, at 94.
224. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32 ("It seems unlikely that common-law
principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive
improvements on petitioner's land.... South Carolina must identify background
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses ... [Lucas] now
intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found.").
225. Farber, supra note 41, at 22.
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update the common law to reflect new knowledge and
understandings.2 2 6
A top-down approach to constitutional protection of property
could seriously thwart the adoption of reforms needed to mitigate and
adapt to climate change. The costs of litigation alone could be too
high for many local and state governments to respond effectively to
the impacts of climate change, much less address the causes through
regulation. Consider a coastal locality's options in responding to sea
level rise, recurrent flooding, and rising storm surge. If major
flooding occurs only occasionally, the locality could choose to ban
seawalls and other hardened structures, opting instead to encourage
use of living shorelines to protect coastal lands. Hardened structures
tend to speed up wave action and worsen the erosion of neighboring
shores not similarly protected.22 7 Living shorelines trap sand and
blunt the force of the tides, slowing erosion and sometimes even
extending the shore areas.228 As the flooding becomes more frequent
and the risk of harm increases, the locality could move to a managed
retreat policy allowing waterfront landowners to remain until
flooding becomes so chronic and serious that it adversely affects
property values and public safety. When that point is reached, the
locality might then adopt a forced retreat policy, banning current uses
as well as new development. The locality could also decide to manage
coastal lands through its land development process, imposing
conditions on the type, location, and manner of development.
Each of these scenarios could lead to constitutional challenges
brought by affected property owners, raising the costs of government
action even if a challenge is unsuccessful. A ban on hardened
structures is likely to be challenged as a partial economic taking,2 2 9
while a ban on development or a forced retreat raises the prospect of
a total economic loss claim under Lucas.23 0 To determine whether the
loss was partial or total, courts would need to define the denominator
for measuring the extent of the economic loss. 2 31 After Murr v.
Wisconsin23 2 though, lower courts are not likely to define the
226. Kysar, supra note 3, at 62 ("Law lags science, it does not lead it." (quoting
Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.))); see
also DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 209 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) ("[Jiudges must not let themselves lag too far behind the progress of
knowledge.").
227. See LIVING SHORELINES: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF NATURE-
BASED COASTAL PROTECTION 3-11 (Donna Marie Bilkovic et al. eds., 2017).
228. See id. at 211-30; see generally Living Shorelines, VA. INST. MARINE ScL.,
http://www.vims.edu/ccrm/outreach/living-shorelines/index.php (last visited
Mar. 28, 2020) (providing information about living shorelines).
229. See, e.g., Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406,
415 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (alleging a significant reduction in value).
230. See, e.g., Gove v. Zoning Bd. Appeals, 831 N.E.2d 865, 871-75 (Mass.
2005) (rejecting the claim of a total loss of economically viable use under Lucas).
231. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1054 (1992).
232. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
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denominator as the regulated portion of the property, as opposed to
the property as a whole.2 3 3 For the most part, courts have rejected
regulatory taking challenges to government actions addressing sea
level rise and flooding, rationalizing that natural processes-not
man-made actions-caused the owner's losses.234 The imposition of
conditions on development through the regulatory process may
present more difficult and complex issues, requiring a takings nexus
review. Any condition might then need to bear an essential nexus to
a legitimate public interest and be roughly proportional to the
projected impact of the proposed development.235
If the coupling of constitutionally protected property and the
economic theory of property continues to grow, it will be difficult for
property law to adapt on the ground through a state's common law
system. The United States Constitution might prevent the change
without payment of just compensation, yet compensating for all the
government actions needed to slow down and reverse climate change
would likely be too costly for governments to handle. Despite its
inherent ability to evolve formally and informally, then, property
would have lost its adaptive advantage.2
36
C. Overcoming the Barriers Through the Lens of Climate Change
Any justification for changing property to enable it to address
public interests should be compelling-so compelling that reasonable
property owners would, if they understood the science and the
evidence, accept the reorientation of the property system without
feeling outraged.23 7 Property rights are fundamentally important to
the liberty interests of individuals and to the operation of economic
systems. It ought to be possible, however, to shape those rights in
ways that are supportive of the earth system, not destructive to the
point of collapse. Climate change provides such a justification,
revealing that the everyday exercise of property rights under the
current, economic-based approach is based on false assumptions that
lead to systemic harm to the entire biosphere. When the harm is
system-wide and approaching a tipping point of no return, societies
must treat the harm as an existential threat different than localized
harms and risks.
The current property system, for example, promotes the
maximization of individual welfare and assumes that such
233. Id. at 1945.
234. See, e.g., Shell Island, 517 S.E.2d at 414-15.
235. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391 (1994).
236. Kysar, supra note 3, at 48 (describing tort law as having an "adaptive
disadvantage" in dealing with climate change claims).
237. .See generally Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 1165 (1967) (introducing the concept of outrage or demoralization costs into
takings analysis).
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maximization is good for society as a whole. Climate change
demonstrates that this leap of faith is not valid. Property systems
can no longer safely operate on the assumption that net social welfare
will be produced by the individual decisions of property owners,
rational or not. The legal system cannot afford to allow the systemic
harm from the exercise of property rights to continue unabated, not
when the harm poses a grave threat to the ability of future
generations to survive.238 Further, even if serious collective action
and political problems were not preventing the adoption of effective
national and global solutions, changes to property would still be
required to correct the daily operation of the property system and
thus reshape the formation of investment-backed expectations.
Now that climate scientists active in the field overwhelmingly
agree on the role of -humans in causing climate change,239
policymakers need to treat the systemic harm resulting from the
exercise of property rights differently than localized harms and risks.
Harm to the earth system within which the property system operates
provides a compelling justification for reevaluating and, when
necessary, adjusting property's norms and values. Addressing the
limitations of the dominant approach will help to realign the property
system within its macro system and move property along a path of
sustainability. Otherwise, constitutional challenges brought by
property owners will continue to thwart much-needed government
efforts to address the causes and the impacts of climate change. Until
the property system is resituated within the larger whole in ways that
account for the integrity of the whole, the investment-backed
expectations of property owners will continue to reflect the economic-
based approach that has become coupled with constitutionally
protected property.
The lens of climate change helps to focus attention on a critical
next question: How do the norms and values of a property system
promoting neoliberal capitalism differ from those of a property system
tempered by the sustainability and integrity of the whole? Answers
to this question will help identify a path forward.
238. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233-34 (D. Or. 2016)
(allowing plaintiffs' claims that the government's knowing endangerment of the
climate system by approving and encouraging fossil fuel development violated
the plaintiffs' fundamental right to life and liberty under the substantive Due
Process Clause, as well as plaintiffs' public trust rights, because of the profound
damage done to the planet and the future loss of natural resources essential to
life), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705
(D. Or. June 8, 2017). On January 17, 2020, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the
district court's decision by a vote of 2 to 1, remanding with instructions to dismiss
due to lack of standing because the plaintiffs' injuries were not redressable.
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1170-75 (9th Cir. 2020).
239. See Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306
Scl. 1686, 1686 (2004).
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IV. REWIRING PROPERTY
In contrast to the goals of the current economic theory of
property, a sustainability based approach would take a holistic,
systems view, nesting the institution of property within the whole and
recognizing property's dependence on the whole. Systems integrity,
resilience, and interconnectedness all would be important features of
a systems approach. Systems integrity requires a focus on the
interaction of the parts and on patterns of organization, not just on
each part in isolation.240 A system is resilient when it has the ability
to return to a particular equilibrium state after a disturbance or can
absorb the disturbance without being significantly redefined.241
Features that promote resilience include the flexibility to adapt,
sufficient diversity of functions and features to enable the system to
recover from a disturbance, and enough redundancy to cover for loss
or damage to functions and resources.242 The goals of a sustainable
property system thus would include ensuring that the property
system is resilient enough to absorb change, whether anticipated or
unforeseen, and allocating and managing property rights in ways that
promote the integrity of the whole.
Because a system reflects the processes of interaction and
patterns of relationships among the parts, the system will always
have properties not reflected in the parts.243 "[T]he qualities of a
complex system refer to the properties of the system that none of its
parts exhibit" and include health, stress, and systems integrity.2 4 4
They arise from interactions among the parts and thus are not equal
to the sum of the parts.245 Properties of the parts include their mass
and energy.246 When measured quantitatively, the sum of one of
these properties of the parts expresses the corresponding property of
the whole,247 but these sums do not measure qualities about the
system's complexity, networks, or integrity. Management strategies
used for properties of a particular part thus cannot adequately
respond to the needs or qualities of the whole.
Justice Brandeis once said, in his dissenting opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,24 8 that "the sum of the rights in the
240. Butler, supra note 42, at 893.
241. Id. at 891-92; see Lance Gunderson, Resilience, Flexibility and Adaptive
Management - Antidotes for Spurious Certitude?, ECOLOGY & SoC'Y (June 30,
1999), https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/issl/art7/.
242. Butler, supra note 42, at 893. See generally BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT,
RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS AND PEOPLE IN A CHANGING
WORLD (2006) (discussing the important role that resilience plays in
environmental management).
243. CAPRA & LuisI, supra note 76, at 63-66.
244. Id. at 368.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 368-69.
248. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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parts cannot be greater than the rights in the whole."2 4 9 As an
example, he explained how a landowner who had sold his air rights
100 feet or more above the surface could not prevent the state from
regulating the height of buildings.250 To this must be added the
necessary implication of the systems view-that the whole is greater
than the sum of the parts. In the parlance of Justice Holmes, the
difference between the whole and its parts is a difference in kind and
not a "question of degree."25 1 Under a systems view, then, the
disaggregation of property should never threaten the integrity of the
whole by undermining its resilience and ability to adapt.
The institution of property has become a self-organizing and self-
regulating system in the sense that its internal rules and processes
shape the operation of property.252  These internal rules and
processes guide property rights by driving or limiting interactions
between right holders and third parties over resources. The
interactions are influenced by norms and options embedded in the
decision-making paths hidden within the structure of property. The
marketplace provides the main network of communication for
economic preferences, responding to inefficiencies of collective
ownership through the emergence of private rights.25 3 The courts act
as the main communicator of legal rights and responsibilities.
Through the marketplace and the courts, property acts as the primary
institution for integrating power over resources into daily life.
Because of how property operates, communicates, and self-regulates,
property has the ability and the power to evolve as conditions change,
correct as new information and knowledge reveal erroneous
assumptions, and assimilate new behavioral rules as informal
practices signal external threats to the system or the whole.
This power to self-regulate should not be underestimated. The
management function of property254 can be broadened to include a
sustainability dimension defined from the perspective of the
realization that the institution of property is nested within the earth
system. In contrast to tort law, which has been described as having
"a distinctly private law history,"2 55 property law has a history that
involves both public and private law. 2 56 Some of the public and semi-
public arrangements recognized in property. law include common
249. Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 416.
252. Butler, supra note 49, at 1242.
253. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
254. For a discussion of the management role of property, see Butler, supra
note 49, at 1223-39.
255. Kysar, supra note 40, at 1.
256. Ugo Mattei, Codifying Property Law in the Process of Transition: Some
Suggestions from Comparative Law and Economics, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 117, 131 (1995).
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lands, public trust property, and semi-commons.257 Property law
even has a category described by the courts in the 1800s as property
affected or "clothed with a public interest."2 5 8
Incorporating a sustainability dimension into property will
require a more prominent role for the governance strategy of
managing property rights.2 59 Under the governance strategy, the
courts are more active in considering and weighing the public and
third-party interests impacted by a property dispute.260  The
governance approach could take into account the interconnectedness
of private rights, collective interests, and the external world,261 and
thus could consider outward-regarding interests related to the whole
and not just to the part. An exclusion-based strategy, in contrast,
focuses primarily on the interests of the private property owner,
protecting the decision-making powers and in rem rights of the
individual owner.262 The exclusionary strategy limits consideration
of third-party interests to those directly related to the property
owner's use or rights and encourages property owners to maximize
individual welfare.263
The common law decision-making model has the flexibility to
adapt to changing conditions. Its incremental approach allows
adaptation to occur more easily than a comprehensive approach
requiring a functioning legislative branch and could more specifically
target false or obsolete assumptions underlying a property rule.2 6 4
The common law also is evolving differently in fifty states-in ways
that depend on the circumstances, conditions, customs, and informal
practices of a particular jurisdiction. As long as the Supreme Court
does not preempt the ability of states to experiment with their
property systems through the Court's interpretation of
constitutionally protected property, the elasticity of the property
concept should allow the development of alternative paths of decision-
making that make the adjustments needed to promote the
257. See, e.g., David Benavides & Ryan Golten, Righting the Record: A
Response to the GAO's 2004 Report Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: Findings and
Possible Options Regarding Longstanding Community Land Grant Claims in
New Mexico, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 857, 871-72 (2008); Karl S. Coplan, Public
Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A Sustainable Middle
Ground, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 305-12 (2010); Lydia Pallas Loren, Building
a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative Commons
Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271,
274-75 (2007).
258. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
259. For a discussion of the governance strategy, see Butler, supra note 49, at
1245-50.
260. Id. at 1245.
261. Id. at 1222.
262. Id. at 1223.
263. Id. at 1223-26, 1233.
264. For a discussion of some of those assumptions, see supra notes 59-85 and
accompanying text.
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sustainability of the whole.265 Just as markets allow transactions to
reflect changing preferences, the legal system also should allow
property to respond to changing biophysical conditions.
Because of its incremental nature, though, common law property
obviously would not be able to accomplish the time-sensitive and
whole-scale change needed to address climate change. An ad hoc
approach would not be quick enough or bold enough to slow down,
much less solve the problem. But even if legislation were enacted, it
would be difficult, ex ante, to reach the underlying incentives, values,
and structure of property that shape the meaning and operation of
property on a daily basis. Without change to the incentive structure
of property, external legal solutions or plans will be met with stiff
resistance in the courts.2 66 The extensive nature of greenhouse gas
emissions and of the land use activities that contribute to the
emissions means that this resistance would be widespread.2 67
Because of the embedded options and behavioral rules hidden in
property's infrastructure, evolution of common law property thus is a
necessary ingredient of any effort to address climate change.
When would an enhanced governance strategy apply? A critical
first step is to identify those resource situations that need a broader
approach because the property system cannot handle a serious
disturbance without threatening the integrity of the whole.2 6 8
Resource situations needing an outward-regarding, governance
management strategy may arise because of the ineffectiveness of the
exclusionary approach in managing the resource given the nature of
the resource (such as when a resource is intangible, lacking physical
boundedness) or because of the large number of users sharing the
resource under a mix of property arrangements. The exclusionary
strategy loses its effectiveness as resources become more complex and
intangible (like the climate system) or as resource situations involve
multiple stakeholders and social networks, especially when
increasing returns to scale result from adding more users.269
Navigable waters, for example, are subject to important private and
public rights, including the rights of private waterfront landowners,
the public navigational servitude, and the government's jurisdictional
interests.2 70 An exclusionary approach would tend to ignore or
discount the interests of third parties and the public, much like what
is now occurring in some western states in a battle over control of
265. See supra notes 117-25, 202-36 and accompanying text (discussing the
coupling of the economic vision of property and constitutionally protected
property).
266. Butler, supra note 49, at 1263-64.
267. See id.
268. Butler, supra note 42, at 893-94.
269. See Rose, supra note 186.
270. Id. at 753--58.
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public waters.2 71 An outward-regarding, governance approach also
could be more effective in dealing with long-term or diffused harms
from property use and with new resources or uses made possible by
technological advances.272 More deliberation is needed to allocate
interests, manage uses, and resolve conflicts when a resource
situation involves present and future generations, private and public
interests, new technology, and serious, diffused or cumulative harm.
How must the incentive structure of property change to address
property's problem with extremes-here, with the problem of climate
change? The changes must correct outdated, inaccurate, or false
assumptions that are part of property's structure and contribute to
climate change. It is important to recognize that changes addressing
the systemic harms resulting from property's operation are correcting
rather than redefining property-vitally important because the
survival of human societies depends on it. If everyone agreed that
our survival depended on changing these assumptions, would
property owners be reasonable in expecting compensation for all the
changes adversely affecting their economic interests or in challenging
the legitimacy of every change that surely would limit their property
rights? It is also important for the property system to replace the
assumption that net social welfare is promoted by the owner's
maximization of individual welfare with a guiding principle of
constrained maximization. The maximization of individual welfare
would be constrained by considerations of the integrity of the whole
built into property's decision-making process to keep the impacts of
the owner's decisions within a safe range. A systems view, with all of
its corollaries, would become a guiding constraint on the operation of
the property system. Qualities of the whole would not just be relevant
but central to property's management strategies for resource
situations involving significant system-wide harm. We must
recognize that changes adopted to protect the integrity of the whole-
whether from collapse because of climate change or some other
extreme harm-are not about emotions but rather about responding
to signs of the imminent collapse of a world that can support human
life. Though an intensity of conviction may underlie the responses, it
is a conviction that arises from a deep understanding of how the earth
system works and about the fragility of that system.273
271. See Cassidy Randall, Who Owns Water? The US Landowners Putting
Barbed Wire Across Rivers, GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.comlenvironment/2018/mar/15/privatized-rivers-us-
public-lands-waterways.
272. See Butler, supra note 49, at 1244.
273. See generally CONNOLLY, supra note 197 (discussing the interaction of
neoliberalism and self-organizing systems).
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